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This Note defends the SEC's statutory authority to seek judicial
disgorgement. In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court held that judicial
disgorgement brought by the SEC constitutes a penalty for the purpose of the
five-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. In the following months,
scholars and practitioners-and atleast one putative class action-have argued
that this opinion spells the end for judicial disgorgement. Their reasoning is
simple: disgorgement is a penalty; there are no penalties in equity; SEC
disgorgement is authorized by a statutory grant ofequity jurisdiction; therefore,
SEC disgorgement is not authorized. This Note refutes the premise that there are
no penalties in equity by looking at the Court's precedents and general approach
to equitable remedies. Further, it offers an affirmative defense of the SEC's
authority to seekjudicial disgorgement by pointing to congressional ratification.
Next, the Note argues that Kokesh should be understood as a warning shot,
directing the SEC to pull back its overly aggressive utilization ofdisgorgement.
This Note concludes that the lesson ought to be heeded by similarly situated
agencies as well-particularly the Federal Trade Commission.
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Introduction
"Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes," Judge Wilson
explained.' "The question before this Court is if the Supreme Court does."2 The
elusive elephant in this metaphor is the fate of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)'s authority to seek disgorgement, an equitable remedy that
orders an offender to give up all profits earned through some illicit act.3 The
mousehole is a footnote-footnote three--of a recent Supreme Court opinion,
Kokesh v. SEC.4 In that case, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 2462, a
five-year statute of limitations on any civil fine or penalty, applies to "claims for
disgorgement imposed as a sanction for violating a federal securities law."5 The
logic in Kokesh implies that § 2462's statute of limitations should apply to any
agency's use of disgorgement, not just the SEC's.6 This holding is significant in
itself, as a variety of agencies have sought disgorgement under their equitable
1. SEC v. Jammin Java Corp., No. 2:15-cv-08921 SVW (MRWx), 2017 WL 4286180,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14,2017) (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
2. Id.
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (10th ed. 2014).
4. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 n.3 (2017).
5. Id. at 1639.
6. Commentators have begun to reach this conclusion with regards to several other
agencies and practice areas. See, e.g., Theodore R. Flo, Supreme Court's Kokesh v. SEC Ruling Limits
CFPB Disgorgement, CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (June 7, 2017), http://
www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2017/06/07/supreme-courts-kokesh-v-sec-ruling-limits-cfpb-
disgorgement [http://perma.cc/DRR4-6BNH]; see also Jennifer M. Thomas & Gugan Kaur, Supreme
Court Ruling on SEC Statute of Limitations May Affect Other Agencies' Pursuit of Disgorgement, FDA
L. BLOG (June 15, 2017), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fdalaw bloghymanphelps/2017/06/supreme-
court-ruling-on-sec-statute-of-limitations-may-affect-other-agencies-pursuit-of-disgorgement.html





authority in order to remove incentives for illegal behavior that would exist if
wrongdoers were allowed to keep their ill-gotten profits.'
But it was not this holding that has sent defendants on their big-game hunt.
Rather, it was the text of Kokesh's footnote three, which stated that the opinion
should not be read as validating disgorgement.8 The Justices have previously
warned against reading into such disclaimers,9 but court watchers are apparently
undeterred. Many practitioners and some scholars have suggested that this terse
footnote spells the end for the SEC's use of disgorgement.10 Some defendants
have already put forth some of these arguments in courts, challenging the
disgorgement authority of both the SEC and the FTC, although without success
so far." Notably, a class action complaint was recently filed against the SEC
alleging the invalidity of disgorgement.12 Responding to these challengers, this
Note explains that concerns about disgorgement's future availability to agencies
are largely overblown.
Essentially, these disgorgement doomsayers-including Craig Jalbert, the
lead plaintiff in the putative class action"'-begin with a single premise: a
remedy cannot be both equitable and a penalty.14 This premise leads to a
syllogism: remedies are either penalties or equitable, but not both; the Supreme
Court held that disgorgement is a penalty; thus, disgorgement is not a proper
equitable remedy.' This argument cuts to the heart of the SEC's authority to
seek disgorgement in federal courts. A court of appeals first held that the SEC
7. See, e.g., Complaint, United States v. Accolade Constr. Grp. Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5855
(May 23, 2017 S.D.N.Y.).
8. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3 ("Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an
opinion on whether courts possess authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or
on whether courts have properly applied disgorgement principles in this context.").
9. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1561 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(directing lower courts not to "construe" the Court's "explicit disclaimer[s]" "as signals of where this
Court stands" and criticizing courts for "ignor[ing] those instruction" in the past).
10. For this argument by scholars, see, for example, Samuel Bray, Equity at the
Supreme Court, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 10, 2017), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/10/equity-at-the-supreme-court [http://perma.cc/43GX-2YNH];
and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Kokesh Footnote 3 Notwithstanding: The Future of the Disgorgement
Penalty in SEC Cases (UCLA School of Law, Law-Econ. Research Paper No. 17-12, 2017),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2992719 [http://perma.cc/SY3A-EYU6]. For practitioners, see, for example,
Robert Anello, Chronicle of Disgorgement's Death Foretold: Kokesh v. SEC, FORBES (July 11, 2017
5:53 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2017/07/11/chronicle-of-disgorgements-death-foretold-
kokesh-v-sec/2/#345602059cf9 [http://perma.cc/V3YE-4Q7Z]; and Maranda Fritz & Brian Steinwascher,
Demise of Disgorgement? Kokesh and Honeycutt in Tandem, LAW360 (June 3, 2017), http://
www.law360.com/articles/93902 1/demise-of-disgorgement-kokesh-and-honeycutt-in-tandem [http://
perma.cc/64XQ-3UK7].
11. See, e.g., SEC v. Jammin Java Corp., No. 2:15-cv-08921 SVW (MRWx), 2017 WL
4286180, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14,2017).
12. Class Action Complaint, Jalbert v. SEC, No. 1:17-cv-12103 (D. Mass. Oct. 26,
2017).
13. See id. at 1-2.
14. Bray, supra note 10.
15. See id.
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could seek judicial disgorgement in Texas Gulf Sulphur in 1971.16 The court
invoked well-established Supreme Court precedents,17 including Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., which held that when a statute allows courts to issue
injunctions, "all the inherent equitable powers of the [court] are available for the
proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction."'8 Since the securities
exchange laws explicitly authorize injunctions as a remedy for violations,'
9 the
court in Texas Gulf Sulphur reasoned that the statutory scheme necessarily
granted courts the full range of equitable remedies.20 Jalbert and other critics of
the SEC's use of disgorgement assume that the categories "penalty" and
"equitable remedy" are mutually exclusive-thus, if they can show that
disgorgement is a penalty, it cannot be an equitable remedy, and it does not
become available to the courts merely by a statutory grant of injunctive authority.
The critics' argument draws support from case law. In Texas GulfSulphur
itself, the court seemed to cabin its holding: "[T]he SEC may seek other than
injunctive relief in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, so long as such
relief is remedial relief and is not a penalty assessment."21 And in Great West
Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, the Supreme Court explained that
"' [e]quitable' relief must mean something less than all relief,"22 implying that
there must exist at least some remedies which do not follow on the coattails of
injunctive authority. The Court provided an example of a nonequitable remedy
in Tull v. United States, holding that civil penalties are not available as a remedy
to courts sitting in equity.2 3 The argument, then-though one we dispute-is that
if disgorgement is a civil remedy and a penalty, then it is a civil penalty; and if
disgorgement is a civil penalty, then it is not available to courts without some
statutory grant, because it does not follow .from courts' injunctive authority.
With agency use of disgorgement on the line, the stakes of this argument
are enormous. Disgorgement is an important tool used by several federal
agencies, which rely on it to remove incentives to break the law. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), for example, seeks injunctive relief in cases involving
unfair or deceptive trade practices.24 The FTC's use of disgorgement appears to
16. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
17. See id. at 1307 (citing Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960);
United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946)).
18. Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012).
20. Tex. GulfSulphur, 446 F.2d at 1308-09 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1309.
22. 534 U.S. 204, 209 (2002) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 258
n.8 (1993)).
23. 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987).
24. See, e.g., FTC v. BurnLounge, Inc., 584 Fed. App'x. 315 (9th Cir. 2014). While the
FTC is authorized to seek "the refund of money or return of property, [or] the payment of damages" to
redress unfair or deceptive trade practices, 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b), the FTC has also sought disgorgement
under its 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) authority in cases involving false advertisement (which does not specifically




be penal in character, based on the criteria set out in Kokesh.25 It is employed.in
the public interest,26 is punitive (in the sense that its primary purpose is
deterrence),27 and is not purely compensatory.28 The same is true for many other
agencies.29 And, unlike the SEC, which is authorized to pursue civil penalties for
violations of securities laws,30 some agencies have no recourse to any formal
legal remedy as they seek to implement their substantive statutes. Given the
numerous practitioners who have expressed the view that Kokesh spells the end
of disgorgement, litigation attacking all of these agencies is certainly in the
works. In fact, a number of defendants have already raised these sorts of
argument against the FTC.
The facile argument that "there are no penalties in equity" would thus be
hugely disruptive to the administrative state-potentially barring a favorite tool.
But for all its alluring simplicity, we contend that it is unpersuasive. This Note
sets out the argument that agencies, such as the SEC and the FTC, are authorized
to seek judicial disgorgement and that Kokesh does not alter this conclusion. As
we explain, the holding that disgorgement, as sought by the SEC, is a penalty for
the purposes of § 2462's statute of limitations is consistent with earlier Court
precedent that found disgorgement to be equitable. Further, Congress has
affirmatively ratified, by statute, the SEC's authority to pursue disgorgement.
That does not mean, however, that Kokesh does not have broader implications
for the SEC and the administrative state. This Note argues that Kokesh should
be understood as a warning shot, directing the SEC to pull back its overly
aggressive utilization of disgorgement. This lesson ought to be heeded by
similarly situated agencies as well-particularly the Federal Trade Commission.
Part I provides a brief background on the history of the SEC's use of
disgorgement and the overall stakes of associated with the potential loss of this
tool. Part II turns to Supreme Court's precedents discussing disgorgement. These
precedents establish that there is no inherent contradiction in disgorgement's
25. M. Sean Royall & Richard H. Cunningham, Will "Kokesh v. SEC " Put a Kink in
the Federal Trade Commission's Disgorgement Hose?, WLF LEGAL PULSE (July 10, 2017), http://
wlflegalpulse.com/2017/07/10/will-kokesh-v-sec-put-a-kink-in-the-federal-trade-commissions-
disgorgement-hose [http://perma.cc/8NQT-PEV2].
26. FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC., 654 F.3d 359, 372-73 (2d Cir. 2011)
27. See Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(July 31, 2003), http://www.fic.gov/public-statements/2003/07/policy-statement-monetary-equitable-
remedies-including-particular [http://perma.cc/SWK9-WP9W].
28. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997).
29. See, e.g., CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (discussing the CFPB);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Sidoti, 178 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing the CFTC);
United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing the FDA); United
States v. Local 1804-1, Nos. 90 Civ. 0963, 90 Civ. 5618, 1993 WL 77319 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1003)
(discussing the Department of Justice).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (2018); see also 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a) (2018) (authorizing the
CFPB to impose civil penalties).
31. See FTC v. CreditBureau Ctr., LLC,No. 17 C 194, 2018 WL 482076 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
14 2018); FTC v. J. William Enters., No. 6:16-cv-2123-Orl-31DCI, 2017 WL 4776669 (M.D. Fla. Oct.
23, 2017).
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status as a penalty and an equitable remedy-in fact, the Court has explicitly
referred to the remedy as being both penal and equitable. While Kokesh defines
ancillary restrictions on the use of disgorgement hat flow from a statute, it is
only by incorrectly conflating contexts and senses of "penalty" that critics
conclude that agency disgorgement will soon be no more. This undermines one
of the premises of the syllogism on which commentators have relied to conclude
that Kokesh spells the end for judicial disgorgement. Part II continues by
rebutting a related but distinct argument: that the Court's precedents establish
that equitable remedies must be compensatory. By refuting each of these
arguments, we show that nothing in the doctrine is incompatible with the
determination that disgorgement is an equitable remedy.
After establishing that the Supreme Court's caselaw does not preclude
characterizing disgorgement as an equitable remedy, Part III lays out an
affirmative argument that the SEC is authorized to seek judicial disgorgement.
We analyze the SEC's substantive statutes in light of the Court's equity doctrine,
showing how Congress has explicitly ratified the use of disgorgement. When
considered in relation to the Court's broader framework for addressing the
boundaries of equity in the context of statutory enactments, this congressional
ratification ought to be dispositive.
Part IV explores a previously unrecognized theme underlying the decision
in Kokesh: discomfort with the SEC's aggressive enforcement posture, and
particularly the Agency's use of disgorgement. While Kokesh should not be read
as undermining the SEC's authority to seek disgorgement in general, the Court's
language does suggest certain significant limitations. To understand the
imposition of these limitations, it is necessary to contextualize Kokesh within a
larger narrative of the Court's efforts to police the SEC. Once placed in this
broader context, it becomes clear, we argue, that the Agency should implement
guidance on its use of disgorgement that reflects the restrictions implied by the
Court. Part V then turns to the implications of Kokesh for the FTC, noting that
parallel concerns regarding the agency's recent aggressive expansion of its use
of disgorgement make it a potential target for future judicially-imposed
restraints.
I. An Overview of Disgorgement
As an initial matter, it is worth briefly discussing how and why
disgorgement became a central component of the SEC's enforcement regime.
This Part begins by tracing disgorgement's history. But a consideration of the
rise of disgorgement does far more than just provide background-it sheds light
on the stakes of the post-Kokesh debates over disgorgement's equitable
characteristics. The SEC came to rely on disgorgement largely for its flexibility
as a law enforcement ool. Disgorgement allows the Agency to precisely tailor a
remedy appropriate to the offense in a way that civil penalties often cannot. And




by the independence and authority of Article III courts. History reveals that the
SEC would not be just as well-off without disgorgement. And in addition to the
SEC, disgorgement plays an important role in the law enforcement regimes at
other agencies, some of which lack these alternatives. Removal of disgorgement
from the package of equitable remedies would have wide-ranging consequences
for the administrative state as we know it.
A. The History of SEC Judicial Disgorgement
Fraud and abuse in the securities industry became an especially pressing
concern for Americans after they contributed to the 1929 stock market crash.32
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress passed a series of laws to ensure
that "the highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the securities
industry."3 One of these laws, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, created the
SEC. For nearly the first four decades of its existence, the only remedy the SEC
routinely sought under the Act was injunctive relief-the only form of relief
explicitly provided for in its substantive statute.34
In the early 1970s, the SEC began to ask courts to grant disgorgement or
restitution ancillary to injunctive relief.35 The Commission's experience had
shown that injunctive relief did little to dissuade offenders from the often-
lucrative violation of securities law.3 6 Thus, the SEC urged the district court in
Texas GulfSulphur "to provide a remedy which, in accord with the congressional
purpose of the 1934 Act, [would] protect the investing public by providing an
effective deterrent to future violations."37 The district court obliged, and the
Second Circuit affirmed its authority to do so.3 8 The circuit court relied on
Supreme Court precedent which provided that statutory grants of injunctive
authority enable district courts to employ the full range of equitable remedies
ancillary to an injunction.3 9 The Act's grant of injunctive authority, coupled with
Supreme Court precedent declining to "infer from the [Act] a purpose to
circumscribe the courts' power to grant appropriate remedies,"4 0 led the court to
32. Cf Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1639-40 (2017) (discussing the history of
securities regulation).
33. Id. at 1640 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963)).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Edmund B. Frost, SEC Enforcement ofthe Rule 10b-5 Duty to Disclose Material
Information-Remedies and the Texas Gulf Sulphur Case, 65 MICH. L. REv. 944, 962-66 (1967).
37. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd in part,
446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971).
38. Tex. GulfSulphur, 446 F.2d 1301.
39. Id. at 1307-08. Among those cases that the circuit court relied on are Mitchell v.
Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960); UnitedStates v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1951); and Porter
v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
40. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 391 (1970).
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conclude that the statutory scheme at the time authorized grants of disgorgement
as an equitable remedy.
The SEC eagerly embraced its newfound authority to rid violators of their
ill-gotten gains.41 Indeed "[d]isgorgement has become the routine remedy for a
securities enforcement action. If a person is found in violation and has profited
from the illicit transaction, courts generally order the disgorgement of those
profits."42 Superinjunctive remedies became so central to the SEC's enforcement
regime that Congress explicitly gave the SEC the ability to seek civil penalties
in district court proceedings and disgorgement in administrative proceedings in
1990.43 Additionally, Congress eliminated the need for the SEC to rely on courts'
ancillary equitable powers when it amended the Exchange Act to allow the SEC
to "seek . .. any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the
benefit of investors."44 Despite the fact that neither of these statutes expressly
authorizes judicial disgorgement, "[t]he legislative histories of both laws
demonstrate that, because Texas Gulf Sulphur confirmed that disgorgement was
part of a federal court's inherent equitable powers, Congress did not see a need
to provide federal courts with express authority to order disgorgement."
45
The Commission clearly understood their statutory scheme to permit
courts' grants of disgorgement, as it has significantly expanded the scope of its
disgorgement actions in the last few decades.46 In SEC v. Contorinis, for
example, the Second Circuit upheld an order requiring disgorgement of profits
earned by a fund of which the defendant was a manager-which went well
beyond the defendant's personal gains.47 And in SEC v. Whittemore, the
Commission successfully held a defendant jointly and severally liable for a
pump-and-dump scheme, even though he shared in the profits with other
perpetrators of the fraud.48 Disgorgement accounts for a tremendous amount of
the money recovered each year by the SEC-in 2016, the Commission brought
41. Dixie L. Johnson et al., King & Spalding Discusses Potential Effects of SEC
Disgorgement as a Penalty, COLUM. L. SCH.: BLUE SKY BLOG (June 21, 2017), http://clsbluesky
.aw.columbia.edu/20 17/06/21/king-spalding-discusses-potential-effects-of-sec-disgorgement-as-penalty
[http://perma.cc/637E-DLUM].
42. SEC v. Pardue, 367 F. Supp. 2d 773, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2005). As an empirical matter,
the SEC's use of disgorgement, as well as the amounts received in disgorgement actions, increased
significantly in the years following the passage of the Dodd Frank Act. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C.
Pritchard, The SEC's Shift to Administrative Proceedings: An Empirical Assessment, 34 YALE J. ON REG.
1, 1, 24 tbl.4 (2017).
43. Johnson et al., supra note 41; see Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d) (2018)).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2012); see also Johnson et al., supra note 41 (discussing the
SEC's authority to seek disgorgement).
45. Johnson et al., supra note 41.
46. Id.
47. 743 F.3d 296 (2014).




in nearly $3 billion in disgorgement payments, more than double what it
collected in other types of penalties.4 9
B. The Stakes ofAgency Judicial Disgorgement
The outsized importance of disgorgement in the SEC's enforcement regime
raises some questions. First, why does the SEC not just rely on civil penalties,
which are explicitly authorized by statute? The answer to this question can be
found in the SEC's brief in Kokesh: the SEC views civil penalties and
disgorgement as two completely different tools, suited to two different ends. The
brief emphasizes that "disgorgement will sometimes be inappropriate even when
a securities-law violation has been proved."50 And while both remedies seek to
disincentivize violations, civil penalties are not flexible enough to meet the
SEC's needs. Penalties may be too harsh in cases where offenders earn
negligible profits or commit less odious violations. They may also be too lax
when profits from violations significantly exceed the statutory caps on
penalties.5 2 Because it is the Commission's job to combat an ever-evolving evil,
it makes sense that the SEC feels that it needs flexible tools.
Another reasonable question is why the SEC does not rely more often on
administrative disgorgement when it has explicit statutory authority to do so. It
is not obvious that increased handling of these matters through SEC
administrative actions is a better outcome. While most cases settle, not all do. In
a world where the SEC already is "facing heavy criticism for using
administrative proceedings to benefit from its purported 'home court'
advantage,"5 it is easy to imagine why the SEC might think that justice is better
accomplished when enforcement is pursued in an independent, Article III court.
Moreover, the very authority of SEC administrative law judges (ALJs), on which
administrative remedies rely, is under attack.54 In January of 2018, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in Lucia v. SEC,55 a case which presents the question of
"[w]hether administrative law judges of the Securities and Exchange
49. Hazel Bradford, SEC Disgorgement Practices Challenged in Lawsuit, PENSIONS &
INV. (Oct. 27, 2017, 4:14 PM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20171027/ONLINE/171029833/sec-
disgorgement-practices-challenged-in-lawsuit [http://perma.cc/6L33-NDSA].
50. Brief for Respondent at 17, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529).
51. Id. at 18.
52. Indeed, when Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, it "was
concerned that '[d]isgorgement of illegal profits . . . merely restores a defendant o his original position
without extracting a real penalty for his illegal behavior."' Id. at 22-23 (alteration in original) (quoting
H.R. Rep. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1983)).
53. Johnson et al., supra note 41.
54. Id; see also Marty Lederman, Mystery and Audacity in Lucia, 36 YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Apr. 16, 2018) (Noting that some have characterized the Lucia petitioners'
challenge as a battle to "rein in a set of adjudicators who have become beholden to their agency's
regulators.").
55. Miscellaneous Orders, U.S. SUP. CT. (Jan. 12, 2018), http://www.supremecourt.gov
/orders/courtorders/0 11218zr_3d9g.pdf [http://perma.cc/RQL9-BNAM].
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Commission are Officers of the United States within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause."s" If the Justices answer in the affirmative, then the
constitutionality of the SEC's administrative regime could be called into
question. Given this potential uncertainty, it is understandable that the SEC
might prefer to pursue enforcement before an institution whose authority is
enshrined in the Constitution (and avoid potentially making the SEC's
legitimacy crisis even worse)."
Still, if one does not share the SEC's assumptions and concerns, it is easy
to dismiss the potential loss of disgorgement as nondisruptive. Indeed, critics of
SEC judicial disgorgement have gone as far as to argue that its loss "would not
raise an alarm in the realm of SEC enforcement."58 This argument discounts the
SEC's arguments and assumes that enforcement would be just as effective if the
SEC relied on administrative disgorgement and other criminal and civil
remedies.5 9 Even if this were so, this argument risks understating the potentially
enormous impact of a decision removing the SEC's authority to seek judicial
disgorgement. The Supreme Court has made clear that the test for whether a
remedy is equitable is whether that remedy was historically equitable.60 If the
Court were to hold that the SEC did not have the power to seek disgorgement as
part of the package of equitable remedies, it would likely do so by holding that
disgorgement is not historically equitable. Such a discussion would not be
limited to the securities context. Thus, a decision eliminating the SEC's
disgorgement authority would likely undermine other agencies' authority to seek
disgorgement as well. And there are many agencies who rely on disgorgement
to enforce their substantive statutes that, unlike the SEC, have far sparser
alternative remedies to fall back on.
An illustrative example of the important role that equitable disgorgement
plays in agency enforcement can be found in a recent case in the Southern
District of New York: United States v. Accolade.6 1 In Accolade, the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), filed suit alleging violation of the
56. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lucia v. SEC (2017) (No. 17-130).
57. While the recent litigation in Lucia explains why the SEC is not content to abandon
disgorgement going forward, the recency of the grant of certiorari might call into question whether the
legitimacy of SEC ALJs was a motivating factor for past action. Still, it is quite possible that the SEC was
aware of the possibility of Lucia-like challenges when it acted in the past. The litigation in Lucia itself
has been ongoing for more than five years now and draws heavily on a decades-old Supreme Court
opinion, Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lucia v. SEC (2017)
(No. 17-130).
58. Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Fagade of SEC Disgorgement, HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 12 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/RyanThe-Equity-FaC3%A
7ade-of-SEC-Disgorgement.pdf [http://perma.cc/4U63-VYC8].
59. Id.
60. See infra Part III. Since Kokesh did not do such a historical inquiry, it is difficult to
imagine that it spells the end of disgorgement, absent some further proclamation from the Supreme
Court-regardless of what one thinks of footnote 3.
61. United States v. Accolade Constr. Grp., Inc., No. 15 Civ. 5855, 2017 WL 2271462




EPA's Renovation, Repair, and Painting Rule (RRP Rule).62 The RRP Rule was
promulgated under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and prescribes
conduct for firms involved in demolitions that could cause the release of lead
into the environment.6 3 The Government alleged that Accolade repeatedly
violated the RRP Rule in its work, as shown by evidence collected by EPA
inspectors.64
The Government sought only equitable remedies in its complaint.6 5
Pursuant to TSCA, the complaint requested several injunctions and
disgorgement "of all proceeds that [Accolade] received in connection with its
unlawful renovation activities."66 While TSCA does provide for the award of
civil penalties in an administrative hearing,67 the remedies available when the
EPA decides to enforce TSCA through litigation are limited to equitable
remedies.68 When the Government challenged Accolade's request for a jury trial
on the grounds that there is no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial when
only equitable remedies are on the table,6 9 the court agreed, holding not only that
disgorgement was equitable in nature, but also that that disgorgement was
available as an ancillary remedy when the EPA seeks injunctions under TSCA.70
The case settled before trial, with Accolade agreeing to pay $58,000 in
disgorgement.n
Disgorgement played a crucial role in Accolade and will continue to play
an important role in EPA enforcement of the RRP. Consider the incentives for a
demolition and repair company under TSCA if only injunctive relief is available.
Compliance with the RRP Rule would presumably make work more expensive
than it would otherwise be. In such a situation, firms are incentivized to violate
the rule until they are enjoined from doing so, since such a strategy maximizes
the money saved during the period in which the firm is noncompliant. Without
fines or disgorgement, the Government would be limited to playing a futile game
of whack-a-mole, trying to enjoin firm after firm. The SEC, on the other hand, is
62. Manhattan US. Attorney and EPA Announce Lawsuit Against Accolade
Construction Group Incfor Violating Lead Paint Safety Rules, U.S. ATT'Y'S OFF. (July 27, 2015), http://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-and-epa-announce-lawsuit-against-accolade-
construction-group-inc [http://perna.cc/V7Y8-LFEC]; see also Complaint, United States v. Accolade
Constr. Grp., No. 15 Civ. 5855 (July 27, 2015 S.D.N.Y.), 2017 WL 2271462.
63. See 40 C.F.R. § 745, Subpart E (2017).
64. Complaint at 6-8, Accolade, No. 15 Civ. 5855.
65. Id. at 13-17.
66. Complaint at 15,Accolade, No. 15 Civ. 5855.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (2012).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2616, 2689 (2018).
69. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Defendant's Jury
Demand at 2, Accolade, No. 15 Civ. 5855.
70. United States v. Accolade Constr. Grp., Inc., 15 Civ. 5855, 2017 WL 2271462, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017).
71. Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Consent Decree with Accolade Construction
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authorized to seek civil penalties. While disgorgement may be a replaceable part
of the SEC's practice, the same is simply not true for every agency and every
.statute.
Disgorgement plays an important role in other law enforcement contexts as
well. The Federal Trade Commission, for example, often pursues equitable relief
when policing unfair or deceptive trade practices.72 The FTC's use of
disgorgement has many of the punitive hallmarks identified in Kokesh.
7 3 It is
employed in the public interest,74 is punitive,75 and is not purely compensatory.76
This application would almost surely be barred by any opinion using the logic of
Kokesh to eliminate SEC disgorgement. The same is true for the Department of
Justice's use of disgorgement in the Civil RICO context,77 the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau's enforcement of consumer financial law, 7  the
CFTC's enforcement of commodities trading law,79 the FTC's enforcement of
antitrust laws,80 and the FDA's enforcement of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act.8 The total loss of disgorgement as an equitable remedy would shock the
administrative state and potentially cripple agencies' ability to enforce the law.
But, as mentioned before, Kokesh did not eliminate the SEC's authority to
seek disgorgement-nothing in the argument or its structure furnished the
historical information required to move disgorgement from equitable to legal.
82
In fact, Kokesh's ruling that disgorgement can be a penalty is wholly consistent
with decades of established precedent.
As Part II explains, the Court's precedent has established the remedy's
equitable nature in a manner that is not undercut by the Court's characterization
of disgorgement in Kokesh.
72. See, e.g., FTC v. BurnLounge, Inc., 584 Fed. App'x. 315 (9th Cir. 2014). While the
FTC is authorized to seek "the refund of money or return of property, [or] the payment of damages" to
redress unfair or deceptive trade practices 15 U.S.C. § 57b(b) (2018), the FTC has also sought
disgorgement under its 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) authority in cases involving false advertisement (which does
not specifically authorize disgorgement). See, e.g., BurnLounge, 584 Fed. App'x. at 317.
73. M. Sean Royall, Antitrust & Competition Policy-Federal Trade Commission,
WLF LEGAL PULSE (July 10, 2017), http://wlflegalpulse.com/2017/07/10/will-kokesh-v-sec-put-a-kink-
in-the-federal-trade-commissions-disgorgement-hose [http://perma.cc/8NQT-PEV2].
74. FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC., 654 F.3d 359, 372-73 (2d Cir. 2011).
75. See Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies-Including in Particular
Disgorgement and Restitution, FTC (July 21, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Policy Statement], http://
www.fic.gov/public-statements/2003/07/policy-statement-monetary-equitable-remedies-including-
particular [http://perma.cc/6JGM-JQEQ].
76. FTC v. Febre, 128 F.3d 530, 537 (7th Cir. 1997).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Local 1804-1,Nos. 90 Civ. 0963, 90 Civ. 5618, 1993 WL
77319 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15).
78. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Sidoti, 178 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir.
1999).
79. See, e.g., CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D.N.Y 2012).
81. See, e.g., United States v. Universal Mgmt. Servs., 191 F.3d 750 (6th Cir. 1999).




II. Disgorgement Is a Penalty and a Remedy in Equity
Despite the prognostication of those saying that the Court's recognition of
SEC disgorgement as a penalty is incompatible with its status as a remedy in
equity, the Court has held otherwise. As this Part details, an analysis of the
Court's doctrine strongly supports the claim that disgorgement is an equitable
remedy. The Court has recognized that "penalty" is "a term of varying and
uncertain meaning."83 That is, what may be labeled a penalty for one purpose
may be construed differently in other contexts. As the Kokesh opinion
recognizes, even a private action for restitution-which the Kokesh Court
implies is a proto-typical equitable action-may be labeled penal in some
circumstances.84 It is, therefore, inappropriate to assume that what is a "penalty"
for the purposes of § 2462 is also as "civil penalty" as it was understood by the
Court in Tull v. United States, and thus unavailable in equity.8
A. There Are Penalties in Equity
The decision in Tull provides strong reasons to reject not only that
conflation of "penalty" and "civil penalty," but also the broader contention that
disgorgement is not an equitable remedy. In Tull, the Court decided whether the
Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury trial to determine liability in actions by
the Government seeking civil penalties and injunctive relief under the Clean
Water Act. In arguing that a jury trial was not necessary, the Government sought
to analogize the civil penalties to the equitable remedy of disgorgement.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, rejected this argument, offering an
explanation of direct relevance to the issues raised by Kokesh. First, Justice
Brennan agreed with the Government that "disgorgement of improper profits [is]
traditionally considered an equitable remedy."8 He elaborated by explaining that
a "court in equity was empowered to provide monetary awards that were
incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief."87 Second, he noted that "[a]n
action for disgorgement of improper profits is, however, a poor analogy" for the
sorts of civil penalties imposed by § 1319(d) of the Clean Water Act.88 The
reason, he explained, is that disgorgement is "a more limited form of penalty
than a civil fine."89 In contrast to a civil penalty, which may be set at whatever
83. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. ofTenn. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566, 574 (1934).
84. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017) (citing Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S.
657, 667 (1892)).
85. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
86. Id. at 424.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis added).
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value Congress determines,90 disgorgement is "limited to the restoration of the
status quo."91
Justice Brennan's argument is consistent both with the determination that
disgorgement is equitable in nature and the holding in Kokesh. The Kokesh Court
adopted a broad definition of "penalty" as "a 'punishment, whether corporal or
pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its
laws."' 9 2 This definition, the Court said, gives rise to two principles that guide
the construal of the word "penalty" in § 2462: a sanction is a penalty if (1) the
"wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public" as opposed to a "wrong
to the individual"; and (2) the sanction "is sought 'for the purposes of
punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner'-as opposed to
compensating a victim for his loss."93 The Court sharply qualified the second
principle, explaining that something may be both compensatory and a penalty,
since "sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose."94
The Tull Court did not dispute that disgorgement would have been available
to the Government as a possible remedy. Instead, the Court dealt with the
Government's disgorgement comparison by noting that the Government did not,
in fact, seek anything remotely like disgorgement.95 It is true that the district
court's calculation of the damages (multiplying profit per lot by the number of
lots) 9 6 resembled disgorgement. But what matters for the Seventh Amendment
analysis at issue in Tull is not which remedies were awarded, but which remedies
were sought.97 The opinion strongly implies the order would have been granted
if the Government had confined the remedies sought in Tull to an injunction and
disgorgement of profits.
The Kokesh criteria for penalties would have been met if the Government
had merely sought disgorgement of profits in Tull. First, the conduct of the Tull
defendants was a "wrong to the public."9 Justice Brennan provided a detailed
comparison of the facts in Tull to the public nuisance doctrine.99 Throughout, the
Court's working definition of a public nuisance was "an act or omission which
obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public."100 Second, the public
nature of the offense means that if the Government had sought only
90. See id. at 422.
91. Id. at 424.
92. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Huntington v. Attril, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)).
93. Id. (quoting Huntington, at 667, 668).
94. Id. at 1645 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993)).
95. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
96. Id. at 415-16.
97. Id. at 417-18 ("[W]e examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal
or equitable in nature." (emphasis added)).
98. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 (2017).
99. See Tull, 481 U.S.-at 420-24.





disgorgement, it would not have been compensatory.'0' And finally, the district
court implied that disgorgement would serve the aims of retribution and
deterrence, in addition to restitution. In particular, it responded to statutory
instructions to consider these diverse aims by constructing a remedy identical in
effect to disgorgement.'0 2 Disgorgement for the conduct at issue in Tull, then,
would be both presumably permissible (as an equitable remedy) and penal under
the criteria laid out in Kokesh.
Reading Tull and Kokesh together, a consistent principle can be derived:
while disgorgement is a penalty because it is sought for a violation of a public
law and with the intention to punish the wrongdoer, it remains equitable in nature
so long as the goal of restoring the status quo retains priority. Determining that
such priority is maintained requires not a search into the subjective intentions of
the court or the agency, but rather a confirmation that the amount disgorged is
capped at the actual amount of improper profits obtained through the illicit
action.
B. Disgorgement Can Be Equitable and "Noncompensatory"
While Tull suggests that the "no penalties in equity" argument is unlikely
to succeed, some might read the Court's cases as indicating that SEC
disgorgement cannot be equitable as long as it is noncompensatory. In fact, the
Jalbert complaint advances this idea, which suggests that disgorgement is most
problematic where noncompensatory.10 3  The strongest argument that
disgorgement must be compensatory-and one that is absent in the Jalbert
complaint-is that the language in Tull suggests disgorgement must be
restitutional in nature. While Justice Brennan in Tull emphasized that
disgorgement must be "limited to the restoration of the status quo" to be
equitable, he also referred to disgorgement as "a remedy only for restitution."'0 4
In the next line, he quoted Porter v. Warner Holding Co. for the proposition that
"[r]estitution is limited to 'restoring the status quo and ordering the return of that
which rightfully belongs to the purchaser or tenant.""os
Such language might lead one to conclude that the sort of action the Court
recognizes as both equitable and statutorily authorized by the Clean Water Act
is inapposite to the type of disgorgement at issue in Kokesh, since, as Justice
Sotomayor noted, "in many cases, SEC disgorgement is not compensatory."o6
As she explained, "the disgorged profits are paid to the district court, and it is
101. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
102. Id. at 415-16, 422 (discussing the resemblance of the remedy imposed to
disgorgement and outlining the relevant statutory criteria).
103. Class Action Complaint at 10, Jalbert v. SEC, No. 1:17-cv-12103 (D. Mass. Oct.
26, 2017).
104. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 424 (1987).
105. Id. (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 338 U.S. 395,402 (1946)).
106. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644.
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'within the court's discretion to determine how and to whom the money will be
distributed.",1 7 While the disgorged funds are often paid to victims, some are
dispersed to the U.S. Treasury. A careful analysis, however, reveals that Tull and
Porter do not make compensation a necessary element of equitable relief.
As a formal matter, the principle derived from Tull does not require that
SEC disgorgement be "compensatory" in order to be equitable. So long as it
remains limited to "restoring the status quo"-that is, capped at actual profits-
then it remains equitable.108 More problematic might be the implication that
disgorgement also be limited to "ordering the return of that which rightfully
belongs to the purchaser or tenant."109 One reading of this line suggests that
disgorgement must be tied to particular claims for restitution. Such an
understanding, however, is unsupported by Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,110 the
case that first recognized disgorgement as an equitable remedy and from which
the quoted line originates.
In Porter, the Court explicitly offers "two theories" for finding
disgorgement to be within the equity jurisdiction given to the district court by
the Emergency Price Control Act, 1 ' either of which, the Court says, would be
sufficient on its own.' 12 Under the first theory, disgorgement is justified as a
means of deciding all the various restitution claims that could otherwise be
brought as independent suits.113 Such a justification is in tension with the sort of
"noncompensatory" disgorgement discussed by the Court in Kokesh. The second
theory, however, perfectly aligns with SEC disgorgement. Under the second
theory, disgorgement derives not from the accumulation of private claims, but
rather from Congress's understanding that by leaving courts with the ability to
"adapt[] appropriate equitable remedies to specific situations," courts will be
able "to protect the public interest" and "enforce compliance with the Act."ll4
Noting that "[fjuture compliance may be more definitely assured if one is
compelled to restore one's illegal gains," the Court determined that the type of
disgorgement sought by the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration
is thus authorized by the grant of equity jurisdiction to the district court.
In light of this second theory, it would be wrong to equate Porter with the
proposition that disgorgement is only proper if the profits are returned to victims.
107. Id. (quoting SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997)).
108. Tull, 481 U.S. at 424 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 402).
109. Id.
110. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
111. The case involved a company that was charging rents on apartments in excess of
those permitted by the rent regulations issued under the Emergency Price Control Act. The Administrator
of the Office of Price Administration brought an action to restrain the company from continuing to exceed
the regulated price ceiling, invoking the provision of the Act authorizing the Administrator to apply "to
the appropriate court for an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance
with such provision," including "a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order."
Id. at 346 (quoting the Emergency Price Control Act, 77 Cong. Ch. 2656, § 925(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33 (1942)).
112. Porter, 328 U.S. at 399.
113. Id.




Further, it is clear that the Tull Court did not intend to cite it as such, as the sort
of disgorgement sought by the EPA in Tull would not have been compensatory
either. As already discussed, the Court in Tull acknowledged that disgorgement
could have been sought under the Clean Water Act. The Court clearly implied
that the disgorgement hat could have been sought would be for whatever profits
the defendant earned through filling in the properties at issue in violation of the
Clean Water Act's prohibition on filling material into wetlands adjacent to
navigable waters.115 There is no particular victim to whom the unlawful profits
can be returned for such a violation. Thus, it is most likely that the profits would
have been dispersed into the Treasury. In fact, in at least some modern EPA
disgorgement cases, it has been the practice of the Government to direct
disgorged profits to the Treasury."6
For these reasons, the action in Kokesh fits very closely with the theories
of disgorgement presented in both Tull and Porter. These cases, read together,
reinforce that idea that disgorgement is an appropriate remedy in equity so long
as its priority is restoring the status quo, regardless of penal or noncompensatory
nature. As such, the "no penalties in equity" challenge is largely without support
.in the doctrine.
One response to the foregoing argument is that it invokes reasoning that
appears, arguably, as dicta in opinions that are decades old. Defining both what
constitutes dicta and assessing dicta's precedential relevance raises questions
that are perhaps unresolvable,"' but it is true that the modern Court could
distance itself from the analysis offered above without fully overruling either
Porter or Tull. Porter's language suggesting that a noncompensatory remedy
could be equitable involved the direct restitution of excessive rents to those that
paid them." 8 And Tull, while acknowledging disgorgement as both a penalty and
an equitable remedy, ultimately found the remedy at issue to be a civil penalty. 19
Thus, one might reasonably assert that the full force of stare decisis does not
apply here.
While that may be true, it does not undermine the core of this Note's
argument, which is that the current state of the doctrine does not support the "no
penalties in equity" line of argument. Rather, a stable and coherent case law has
developed around the concept of disgorgement that acknowledges both its
equitable and penal characteristics. Kokesh, as this Note has shown, is consistent
115. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 423 ("In the present case, for instance, the District Court
acknowledged that petitioner received no profits from filling in properties in Mire Pond and Eel Creek,
but still imposed a $35,000 fine. Thus, the District Court intended not simply to disgorge profits but also
to impose punishment." (citation omitted)).
116. See, e.g., Consent Decree at 15-16, United States v. Accolade Constr. Grp.,No. 15
Civ. 5855 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017). That this is the modem practice suggests, but does not confirm, that
the same practice was employed two decades ago.
117. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 953, 991-94 (2005) (summarizing issues with distinguishing holdings from dicta).
118. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 396 (1946).
119. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 424.
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with this case law. Once placed in this context, the argument that claims to
invalidate SEC disgorgement merely by pointing to the language of Kokesh is
revealed to be facile. The case law that provides the background to any modem
evaluation of disgorgement is fully compatible with an interpretation of the
SEC's statutory grant that includes the authority to pursue disgorgement. We
next offer such an interpretation.
III. The Affirmative Case for SEC Disgorgement
This Note has so far provided reasons to doubt the doomsayers who claim
that the Court is preparing to remove disgorgement from the set of tools available
to agencies authorized to seek equitable remedies. Since precedent establishes
that penalties with the factors identified in Kokesh can still be equitable, the sky
is not falling for disgorgement. Still, while the Tull Court said that disgorgement
is equitable, the statement is, arguably, in dicta. It remains to make an affirmative
argument that the SEC is statutorily authorized to seek disgorgement under its
equitable authority. In contrast to Part II, this Part does not only argue that the
Court's doctrine is compatible with the SEC pursuing judicial disgorgement.
Rather, it argues that that such disgorgement has been affirmatively authorized
by statute.
This Part addresses the affirmative case by first explicating the broader
framework of the Court's doctrine on equitable remedies. The Court understands
a grant of equitable jurisdiction within a statutory scheme as generating a
presumption that the bounds of the available remedies are to be set through
analogical reasoning rooted in the historical principles of equity. But analogy on
its own does not determine the meaning of a statutory provision. The
presumption must be weighed against other signals of legislative intent. After
setting out the general framework for how these different aspects of
interpretation interact, this Part examines the strong evidence that Congress has
ratified the SEC's pursuit of judicial disgorgement. This congressional
endorsement of SEC disgorgement provides convincing support that the remedy
is statutorily authorized.
A. The Court's Doctrine on the Boundaries ofEquity
While Tull and Porter arguably endorsed the equitable bona fides of
disgorgement, some might argue that intervening opinions have inaugurated a
new, more originalist method of reasoning about equity that limits those cases'
precedential relevance.12 0 This Section argues that such an interpretation of
120. See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L.
REv. 997, 1014 (2015); Randolph J. Haines, The Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 99 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 451, 457-59 (2014); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 32, 34 (2004).
Note that this originalism is not of the textualist sort, as there is no text guiding these originalist




modem equity doctrine assumes more has changed than is true. A more careful
look at the Court's methodology reveals a continued commitment to a dynamic,
if interstitial approach to equity. Under this flexible approach, which combines
historical analysis with statutory interpretation, the SEC is authorized to seek
judicial disgorgement.
1. The Search for Equity in Historical Analogies
Although references to cases "in equity" can be found in documents as old
and foundational as the Constitutionl2' and the Judiciary Act of 1798,122 neither
Congress nor the courts have ever provided a firm definition of what "in equity"
means.123 Instead, the Supreme Court has consistently looked to history for
inspiration. In Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. W.I Southern, Inc., the Court
explained that the jurisdiction "to entertain suits in equity is an authority to
administer in equity suits the principles ofthe system ofjudicial remedies which
has been devised and was being administered by the English Court of Chancery
at the time of the separation of the two countries."12 4
The operative word in this flexible definition is "principles," implying a
method of reasoning akin to the measured and thoughtful development of
common law. Such development, in fact, characterized the history of equity,
which "grew interstitially, to fill in the gaps of substantive common law ... and
to provide a broader array of remedies."25
This typical approach-dynamic, yet historically bound-is reflected in
Tull. Justice Brennan began his analysis of whether civil penalties could be
equitable by "compar[ing] the statutory action to the 18 th-century actions brought
in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity."12 6
But, in making that comparison, the Court made a point to specify that it need
not engage in "an 'abstruse historical' search for the nearest 180t-century
analog."12 7 Instead, the Court "reiterate[d] [its] previously expressed view that
characterizing the relief sought" through a method of historical, analogical
reasoning is the ultimate goal.128
functional equivalent ofthe power held by eighteenth-century courts-an instance of"originalism without
text." See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism Without Text, 127 YALE L.J. 156 (2017).
121. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
122. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73; 28 U.S.C. § 41(1) (2018).
123. Richard H.W. Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 641, 641 (2006).
124. 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939).
125. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 920 (1987).
126. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
127. Id. at 421 (citing Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)).
128. Id. (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 (1974)).
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2. Analogy or Identity?
The skepticism implied by the Court that one can fruitfully engage in such
an "abstruse historical" inquiry is justified. As some scholars have pointed out,
equity has a long history, full of contradictory determinations, essentially making
any claim to what was or was not allowed by equity inherently questionable.
129
Still, the sort of analogical thinking alluded to through the Court's various
opinions admits degrees of deference to the past; and some, most notably Justice
Ginsburg, have pointed to more recent opinions as inaugurating a level of
deference to the past so severe so as to render equity "frozen in time."1
3 0
The case towards which Justice Ginsburg addressed her criticisms was
Grupo Mexicano, which involved a Mexican holding company near insolvency
that allegedly transferred a number of its assets to escape the claims of its
international bondholders.!31 A group of bondholders sued in federal court and
sought, in addition to damages, a preliminary injunction freeing unrelated assets
that the company would likely need to satisfy a monetary judgment.132 Writing
for a divided Court, Justice Scalia concluded that this sort of injunction was
beyond the authority of the district court since such remedies were unknown to
equity in 1789.133
To look toward history is, of course, not new. But Justice Scalia demanded
something more stringent than analogy, asking instead "whether the relief
respondents requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity."'
34
While the analysis that followed did entertain a proposition from the
Government's amicus brief that the sort of preliminary injunction sought was
analogous to certain applications of a "creditor's bill," Justice Scalia essentially
required not analogy but identity.135 He rejected the Government's suggestion
on the basis that it would require the Court to "speculate upon" whether the
present case would have qualified for the particular relevant exceptions allegedly
available in equity.13 6
Justice Scalia also explicitly rejected the approach defended by Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, which argued for a more flexible approach to equity.
137 In a
dissent emphasizing "principles" and "aims," Justice Ginsburg championed a
"dynamic equity jurisprudence" and argued that, in contrast to other
"contemporary adaptations of equitable remedies," the injunction sought in the
129. See Bray, supra note 120, at 10 16-17; see also Martin Krygier, Law as Tradition,
5 L. & PHIL. 237, 242 (1986) ("[T]he past speaks with many voices.").
130. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value ofa Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 329, 334 (2004).
131. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
132. Id. at 312.
133. Id. at 333.
134. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
135. Id. at 320-21.
136. Id.




case "was a modest measure."'38 Pointing to various earlier decisions, Justice
Ginsburg noted that the majority's static conception of equity broke with past
precedent.1 3 9 The Court's apparent rejection of the more dynamic approach to
equity is particularly problematic given the second theory of disgorgement
offered in Porter, which relies heavily on broader considerations of
congressional purpose.14 0 A shift toward a strictly historical approach would
seem to cast the value of that precedent in doubt.
3. Analogy Plus Principles of Statutory Interpretation
A broader review of Justice Scalia's argument as well as subsequent
opinions of the Court reveals this concern to be unfounded. First, even in Justice
Scalia's Grupo opinion, he hedged on the frozen nature of equity, acknowledging
that "equity is flexible."141 Further, in building his allegedly "historical" account
of equity in 1789, Justice Scalia relied heavily on the Court's own opinions from
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.142 While Samuel Bray has referred to this
move as the construction of an "artificial history,""43 it can more accurately be
described as the standard precedential reasoning that typifies the Court's
jurisprudence.
The survival of the dynamic approach to equity to which Justice Ginsburg
referred can be more vividly and relevantly seen in McCutchen, the latest in a
line of cases interpreting the ERISA's statutory provisions that grant courts
authority to issue injunctions and "other appropriate equitable relief."144 The case
is of particular relevance because, unlike in Grupo Mexicano, the equity power
utilized by the district court in both the ERISA and SEC disgorgement context
is linked to a specific statutory grant. As a result, the resolution of what sort of
equity powers are authorized is more plainly a question of interpretation-in
contrast to the methodology in Grupo Mexicano, which treats equity as "an
independent body of law that is binding. . . of its own force."l 5
The statutory origins of the equity authorization recommend a mode of
interpretation that treats phrases like "equitable relief' or "in equity" as one
would any other piece of statutory language.146 The Court's statutory
138. Id. at 336-37 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
139. Id. .
140. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399 (1946).
141. Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322.
142. Id. at 320 (citing various nineteenth and twentieth century cases on the availability
of a creditor's bill in equity case).
143. See Bray, supra note 120, at 1018.
144. U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88 (2013) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3) (2018)).
145. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 220 (2018).
146. Note, however, that while Congress's intention is the decisive factor for
determining what remedies were included within a grant of "equitable remedies," the Court ultimately
decides whether a suit is "at common law" for the purpose of the Seventh Amendment. See Thompson v.
Cent. Ohio R.R. Co., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134 (1868).
687
Yale Journal on Regulation
interpretation methodology is typified by the use of "canons of statutory
interpretation," various rules and presumptions for construing the meaning of the
text.14 7 One important set of canons resembles the Court's approach to equity in
general. These are the "common law canons," which are grounded in the
presumption "in favor of following common law usage where Congress has
employed words or phrases with well-settled common law traditions."l48 But, as
Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner, explained, "[n]o canon of interpretation is
absolute," as "[e]ach may be overcome by the strength of differing principles
that point in other directions."l49 Specifically, the Court has explained that a
"statutory term" will not be "given its common-law meaning, when that meaning
is ... inconsistent with the statute's purpose."so Carrying this methodology over
to equity, the Court would be expected to interpret authorizations of equitable
remedies in a statute by considering both the historical understanding of the
terms and other factors, such as precedent and the greater statutory scheme.'51
This multi-factor approach is evident in McCutchen, leading to a much
more dynamic and purpose-driven approach to equity than is suggested by
Justice Scalia's static conception in Grupo Mexicano. Writing for the Court,
Justice Kagan joined "historical analysis" with a consideration of ERISA's
"statutory scheme" to reject the argument that an equitable doctrine meant to
prevent unjust enrichment could override the terms of an ERISA plan.15 2
However, while the Court determined that "equitable rules" could not "trump"
the statutory plan, it also said that they may be considered in "properly
construing" what the statute demands.53 Through an analysis that considered the
"rationale" of a particular equitable remedy, the Court essentially delivered the
same result as if it had not rejected the argument based on unjust enrichment.154
McCutchen quite plainly embodies the dynamic and principles-driven approach
to equity that has long typified the Court's methodology.
147. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAw: A PRIMERON HOW
To READ STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION (2016) (providing an overview ofthe Court's use of canons
in statutory interpretation).
148. Id. at 431.
149. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 59 (2012).
150. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990).
151. This interpretive methodology of weighing substantive presumptions-such as the
content of equity-against indicators of congressional intent can be cognized in different ways. One
theory understands statutory interpretation as being governed by its own common law, formed in the
shadow of policy considerations. This "common law of statutory interpretation" is "comparable to, for
example, the common law of contracts, which has developed its own interpretive regimes." Daniel B.
Listwa, Comment, Uncovering the Codfier's Canon: How Codiication Informs Interpretation, 127 YALE
L.J. 464, 470-71 (2017). On a more practical level, this system had been described as governed by "clear
statement rules," which are presumptions that can be displaced by clear statements ofcongressional intent.
These rules function like default rules in contracts, helping to fill gaps in the drafting. Clear statement
rules are discussed further in the next Section.
152. US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 100 (2013).
153. Id. at 101.




The Court, in other words, has not eschewed reliance on past opinions in
favor of novel, historical investigations into the courts of 1798, nor has it
abandoned the dynamic approach toward equity that has long characterized its
decisions. Thus, it would be mistaken to assume that the Court in analyzing SEC
disgorgement would toss out precedents like Tull and Porter. It is much more
likely that the Court will engage in a mode of interpretation that considers these
precedents in light of the statutory scheme and other markers of statutory
meaning. As outlined in the next Section, such an analysis affirms the
authorization of SEC disgorgement, for Congress has implicitly ratified the
SEC's ability to seek disgorgement in court, most pointedly in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and the Dodd-Frank Act. The Court would certainly consider this fact
very persuasive if not dispositive.
B. Statutory History Supports SEC Disgorgement in Court
The previous Section argued that the Court would not turn merely to an
originalist, historical analysis in addressing the question of whether the SEC may
pursue judicial disgorgement. Rather, it will give weight to both its own
precedent and the relevant statutory scheme. As Part II argued, the Court's
precedent already lays out a strong case in favor of finding disgorgement o be
an equitable remedy. For this reason, the historical bounds of equity generate
only weak presumptive weight against the more inclusive statutory authorization
explicated here. This Section turns to that statutory context, which provides the
strongest support for the contention that SEC disgorgement is authorized.
The substantive statutes enforced by the SEC provide persuasive evidence
in favor of judicial disgorgement. In Tull, the Court recognized that
disgorgement under the Clean Water Act would have been authorized through a
provision allowing courts to impose equitable remedies.'55 The authorization of
disgorgement in the SEC context is far less oblique. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
Second Circuit relied on the grant of general equity power to the district court in
§ 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA). 15 6 By the 1980s,
congressional documents recognized this power, with one House report
specifically stating that "the Commission may request that the court order certain
equitable relief, such as the disgorgement (giving up) of illegal profits."' This
understanding uided subsequent amendments to the SEC's power, including the
. 155. The Clean Water Act provided separately for both civil penalties under § 13 19(d)
and injunctive relief under § 1319(b). The Court acknowledged that a "court in equity was empowered to
provide monetary awards that were incidental to or intertwined with injunctive relief," and thus agreed
that "§ 1319(b), which authorizes injunctive relief, provides jurisdiction for monetary relief in equity."
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425 (1987).
156. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307 (2d Cir. 1971).
157. H. REP. No. 98-355, at 7 (1983).
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grant of authority to the SEC to seek disgorgement in administrative
proceedings.158
More recently, Congress ratified the SEC's authority to seek judicial
disgorgement in the text of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which explicitly
acknowledges the remedy's availability.159 Section 308 of SOX specifically
discusses adding civil penalties to "disgorgement funds," which the Act
describes as the funds created through a "judicial or administrative action" in
which "the Commission obtains an order requiring disgorgement."
160 These
provisions are an unambiguous statutory ratification of SEC's authority to seek
disgorgement in court. SOX also gave authority for "any equitable relief that
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors"161 -a legislative
action seen as intended to remove lingering doubts about disgorgement's
legitimacy.162
Further support is provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, which both implicitly
recognizes the SEC's ability to pursue a noncompensatory form of disgorgement
and explicitly authorizes disgorgement for violations of the Commodity
Exchange Act. Although it applies to the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and not the SEC, the amendment to the Commodity
Exchange Act makes fully unambiguous Congress's intention that disgorgement
be a part of a court's equitable jurisdiction.16 3 The statute specifies that "the
Commission may seek, and the court may impose . .. equitable remedies
including ... disgorgement of gains received in connection with [a]
violation."1 64 Further, the statutory text strongly suggests that disgorgement need
not be compensatory, as it separately authorizes "restitution to persons who have
sustained losses proximately caused by such violation," as distinct from
disgorgement.165 Similar language appears in the section of the statute
delineating the relief available to the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau,
where it authorizes disgorgement alongside such distinct remedies as restitution,
refunds, and payment of damages.16 6 These authorizations of disgorgement as an
158. S. REP. 101-337, at 10(1990) ("The SEC's primary statutory remedy for securities
law violations has been the civil injunction, together with such ancillary relief (especially disgorgement
159. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204 § 308, 116 Stat. 779 (describing
funds created through a "judicial or administrative action" in which "the Commission obtains an order
requiring disgorgement").
160. Id. § 308.
161. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 305(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2012).
162. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?,
63 BUS. LAw 317, 326 (2008).
163. Note that a district court recently relied on this explicit authorization to reject a
challenge, based on footnote three of Kokesh, that the CFTC may not pursue disgorgement. CFTC v.
Reisinger, No. ll-CV-08567, 2017 WL 4164197 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 19, 2017).
164. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
§ 743, 124 Stat. 1376, 1735 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(d)(3) (2018)).
165. Id




equitable and noncompensatory remedy clearly evidence a congressional
expectation that the SEC be able to seek a similar remedy.
The Dodd-Frank Act's discussion of the SEC's ability to pursue
disgorgement reinforces this expectation. For example, the Act establishes the
"Investor Protection Fund" to pay awards to whistleblowers and fund specified
activities of the Commission's Inspector General.16 7 In discussing sources the
SEC can use to support this Fund, the Act identifies "any monetary sanction
added to a disgorgement fund ... that is not distributed to the victims."1 6 8 This
language implies that not all disgorgement need be compensatory. This statutory
reference to the SEC's use of disgorgement should be read in conjunction with
the Act's explicit authorization of the CFTC to seek disgorgement, which it
refers to as an equitable remedy, and the similar authorization granted to the
CFPB. Together, they reveal a congressional expectation that the SEC already
possesses the authority to exercise the disgorgement remedy.
The statutory context makes plain that Congress has crafted the securities-
law statutes with the understanding the SEC could seek disgorgement. The Court
has consistently held that such a subsequent congressional ratification of a
particular interpretation of the text is both relevant and persuasive.16 9 For
example, in Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the Court determined that Congress
did not intend for tobacco to be within the FDA's jurisdiction as a drug---despite
clearly falling within the relevant statute's definition of "drug"-because
Congress had developed a separate statutory scheme for tobacco that presumed
the FDA did not have jurisdiction.o7 0 This case presents the opposite fact pattern,
with the statutory grant baked into the SEC's own substantive statutes."
Accordingly, Brown & Williamson Tobacco provides a strong precedent in favor
of implied authorization.17 2 In other words, by the Court's interpretive
methodology, Congress has statutorily ratified the SEC's authority to pursue
judicial disgorgement.
Given the strength of the evidence in favor of Congress's intention to
authorize the SEC to pursue judicial disgorgement, the Court could only decide
to hold disgorgement unavailable if it were willing to do so in the face of
congressional intent. Rarely does the Court intentionally defy congressional
167. Id. § 922 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(g)(2) (2012)).
168. Id. (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706(3)(A)(iii) (2012)).
169. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000);
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chap. of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697 (1995).
170. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 144.
171. In fact, more than simply presuming disgorgement, Congress has affirmatively
included language in the statute endorsing both the SEC's ability to pursue disgorgement and the remedy's
status as equitable. This distinction is significant given the Supreme Court's discomfort with assuming
Congress is aware of lower court-as opposed to Supreme Court-interpretations. See Lightfoot v.
Cendant Mortg. Corp., 137 S. Ct. 553, 563 (2017). That said, even in the absence of the sort of express
language found here, the Court has given significant weight to unbroken lines of lower court decisions
when inferring congressional acquiescence. ESKRIDGE, supra note 147, at 422.
172. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 147, at 422.
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expectations when interpreting a statute. When the Court does defy expectation,
it generally does so through "clear statement rules." Where the Court has
introduced some substantive policy presumption, it will read statutes as
consistent with that presumption unless there is a "clear statement" on the face
of the statute rebutting the presumption.!" For example, in EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co., the Court interpreted Title VI-despite its broad wording-
such that it did not prohibit U.S. companies from discriminating against
minorities employed outside of the territorial jurisdiction, because the statute did
not clearly rebut the presumption against the extraterritorial effect of statutes.
17 4
One could point to the Court's doctrine regarding equity as evidencing a
presumption that equity is limited by historical analogy. As such, the Court might
demand that any congressional attempt to expand the boundaries of "equitable
remedies" be through a clear statement. Arguably, one could read McCutchen as
reflecting such a clear statement rule. There the Court held that the traditional
boundaries of equity applied to the ERISA plan in question absent explicit terms
to the contrary.17 5
What constitutes a sufficiently "clear statement" is hard to predict.
Generally, the clarity of the statement must be weighed against the strength of
the presumption.'7 6 Sometimes that means eminently clear statements are found
to be insufficient. For example, in Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Society, the Court held that the Secretary of Commerce was not required to
certify Japan's whaling practices as an apparent violation of international
agreements.177 The Court pointed to the language of the statute, which required
certification of practices that "diminish[ed] the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program."78  This language of "diminish[ed]
effectiveness," the Court concluded, was not specific enough to rebut the strong,
constitutionally-derived presumption that the executive branch enjoys wide
discretion in foreign affairs.17 9 The Court was willing to invoke a strained
interpretation, which did not accord with legislative history, 80 in order to
173. William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 595 n.4 (1992).
174. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); see also id. at 615-16
(discussing the case).
175. The context in McCutchen was somewhat different from the usual application of
a clear statement rule. The Court invoked equity in order to inform its interpretation of the ERISA plan's
reimbursement plan, stating that it would assume that equity doctrine provides the default absent language
to the contrary. See US Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569 U.S. 88, 103 (2013). This is the application of
the rule to reconstruct he intent of the parties that negotiated the ERISA plan, as opposed to the intent of
Congress.
176. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 173, at 617-19.
177. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
178. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (2018).
179. Japan Whaling, 478 U.S. at 232-33.




maintain what it took to be an important substantive policy-the President's
supremacy in foreign affairs.81
Admittedly, Congress's ratification of SEC disgorgement hrough SOX and
Dodd-Frank does not constitute the most explicit form of legislative action. It
could have, for example, enacted language paralleling the sections of the Dodd-
Frank Act that authorize the CFPB and CFTC to use disgorgement. It is
conceivable that the Court would decline to follow congressional intention and
instead uphold a more tenuous, such that the references to disgorgement merely
evidence an intention to regulate how disgorgement operates if it is part of a
court's historical equitable jurisdiction. But such a text-distorting interpretation
would only be justified by a strong, countervailing substantive presumption-
one akin to the constitutionally motivated presumption underlying Japan
Whaling.182 Such a presumption is simply not warranted in these circumstances.
The presumption that equitable remedies are limited to equity's historical
scope does not have the constitutional valence of the substantive presumption
underlying the most significant clear statement rules. Further, the Court's
doctrine has already recognized that a noncompensatory form of disgorgement
is compatible with the concept of equity. In fact, recognizing the legitimacy
of SEC disgorgement would be precisely the interstitial, statute-dependent sort
of development that typifies the Court's approach to equity. Thus, one could not
motivate a strong clear statement rule on the basis of the need to defend
prudentially the coherency of equity as a body of law.
The strength of the statutory argument, when placed in context with the
Court's flexible approach to equity and its past endorsements of disgorgement,
makes clear why arguments that nothing exactly like disgorgement existed in
1789 should not succeed. For example, Francesco DeLuca has argued that none
of the three historical analogues to disgorgement offered in SEC v. Cavanagh,84
a leading Second Circuit precedent, is a perfect match.185 To take just one
example from the Cavanagh opinion that DeLuca discusses, accounting, a
remedy "by which the chancery ordered an accounting of assets that wrongfully
gained profits might be recovered,"'86 was only available in cases in which a
fiduciary duty was breached-a set of cases narrower than those for which
disgorgement is ordered.8 7 While this example might suggest hat disgorgement
as we know it today did not exist, it does little to defeat the notion that
disgorgement is aligned with the principles of equity. The Court does not demand
181. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 173, at 617.
182. 478 U.S. 221.
183. See supra Part IL.
184. 445 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2006).
185. Francesco A. DeLuca, Sheathing Restitution's Dagger Under the Securities Acts:
Why Federal Courts Are Powerless to Order Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, 33 REv.
BANKING& FIN. L. 899, 913-20 (2014).
186. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d at 119.
187. DeLuca, supra note 185, at 915.
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perfect analogies when shaping modem equity doctrine. Likewise, the
imperfection of existing analogies does not justify defeating the plain meaning
of congressionally enacted statutes.
The affirmative argument for SEC disgorgement is thus quite strong. As
such, the Court should-and likely would-uphold that disgorgement represents
an equitable and statutorily authorized remedy. But that does not imply that the
SEC should not be concerned by Kokesh. The Court could confirm that the SEC
has the authority to pursue disgorgement but deny that the sort of remedies that
the SEC has been seeking-and calling disgorgement-can appropriately be
labeled as such. Part IV explores this possibility, analyzing the limits to
disgorgement suggested by the Court's decision in Kokesh.
IV. Kokesh as a Check on SEC Aggression
Litigation on the SEC's statutory authority to seek disgorgement has
already begun, but, as argued in Parts II and III, this litigation in unlikely to result
in the end of SEC disgorgement. More immediate will be Kokesh's impact on
the SEC's aggressive campaign to push the boundaries of how disgorgement is
calculated. Although court watchers or practitioners have yet to discuss it, the
dicta in Kokesh resolved a circuit split on an issue that was not even briefed:
whether a defendant can be disgorged of illicit gains made by others based on
the defendant's illicit actions. But rather than representing a mere instance of far
reaching dicta, the Court's decision to address these questions ought to be
understood in a broader institutional context. Specifically, the SEC should
understand Kokesh to be a warning that its aggressive interpretation of its powers
has exceeded the boundaries of deference.
A. The SEC's Nonacquiescence Before Kokesh
The dicta in question struck at the SEC's campaign to chip away at a
decades old precedent. In a 1978 decision, SEC v. Blatt, the Fifth Circuit limited
disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action to "the amount of the fee realized
by each defendant for his assistance in executing the fraud." 1 8 In Blatt, two
attorneys traded shares on the basis of inside information on behalf of their
client.8 9 While the client made significant profits from the deals, the attorneys
received only a fee for the services.190 The Fifth Circuit determined that in order
to keep with the equitable goal of restitution, the two defendant-attorneys may
not be disgorged of more than the fee they received for the transactions.
1 91
In 2014, the SEC successfully persuaded the Second Circuit to reject the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the contours of disgorgement. In SEC v.
188. 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978).
189. Id. at 1328.





Contorinis, the Second Circuit upheld a trial court order requiring that the
managing director of a hedge fund disgorge in excess of $7 million in unlawful
profits.19 2 This figure represented the entirety of the profits obtained by the fund
as a result of the director's trading on material nonpublic information. The
director only earned under half a million dollars on the trade personally.19 3 In
upholding this order, the Second Circuit panel acknowledged that its decision
broke with at least some prior holdings, pointing specifically to Blatt's limitation
on disgorgement to a defendant's "personal gain." 94 Outweighing whatever
persuasiveness the Fifth Circuit's opinion may have had, the court determined
that so limiting disgorgement amounts "would run contrary to the equitable
principles that the wrongdoer should bear the risk of any uncertainty affecting
the amount of the remedy," explaining that limiting the disgorgement amount to
direct pecuniary benefit would fail to capture what indirect or intangible benefits
the defendant obtained.195
The decision in Contorinis vastly expanded the power of the SEC's
disgorgement tool-an augmentation the SEC was quick to seize upon. In the
months following the Second Circuit's decision in Contorinis, the SEC sought
to apply its principle in a number of cases-most notably SEC v. Megalli.'96 Like
Contorinis, Megalli involved a trader at a hedge fund who was found to have
executed a trade on the basis of material nonpublic information, and also like in
Contorinis, the SEC sought to disgorge from the trader not only his fee tied to
the trade, but the entire fund's profits. What makes the case of interest, however,
is that it was brought in the Northern District of Georgia-that is, in a district
court residing in the Eleventh Circuit, which is bound by the precedents of the
former Fifth Circuit.19 7
Puzzlingly, in the SEC's brief in support of its motion for summary
judgment, the agency's discussion of the disgorgement remedy exclusively cited
Second Circuit case law. Most significantly, it cited Contorinis for the
proposition that the court has at its discretion the authority to disgorge the
"profits generated for a fund for which a defendant directed illegal trades," 98 but
failed to address Blatt. Only when prompted by the defendant's brief did the SEC
attempt to distinguish the earlier case, improbably stating that it stood "for the
proposition that a defendant may not be required to disgorge funds unrelated to
the fraud." 99 Unsurprisingly, the district judge rebuffed the SEC's bid to hold
192. 743 F.3d 296, 299 (2d Cir. 2014).
193. Id. at 300.
194. Id. at 305 n.5.
195. Id. at 306.
196. 157 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (N.D. Ga. 2015)
197. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (1lth Cir. 1981) (en banc).
198. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at
24, Megalli, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (No. 1:13-CV-03783).
199. SEC's Reply to Defendant's Response to SEC's Motion for Summary Judgment
at 15, Megalli, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (No. 1:13-CV-03783).
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Megalli responsible for the entire hedge fund's profits, finding the court to be
bound by Blatt,20 0 but the Agency continued to push. In response to the court's
request for briefing on civil penalties, the SEC made plain its frustration with the
judge for following her circuit's binding precedent, writing: "Yet the Court has
decided that [Megalli] may not be ordered to pay [the full amount of the fund's
profits]." 20 1 As a result, the SEC continued, "Defendant Megalli has avoided any
meaningful disgorgement order."202
These statements reflect the aggressive posture the SEC has taken with
regard to disgorgement power203-but more specifically they suggest a posture
of nonacquiescence. In its usual application, nonacquiescence refers to agencies'
selective refusal to conduct their own proceedings consistently with adverse
rulings of federal courts of appeals.2 0 4 The practice enables agencies to press
forward their own statutory interpretations in the hope of finding sympathetic
courts of appeal and, potentially, generating a circuit split that will be resolved
in their favor by the Supreme Court. While some courts have expressed concern
with the practice as bordering on lawlessness,205 nonacquiescence has largely
been tolerated on the view that an agency "may well not know which circuit's
law will be applied on a petition for review."206
In Megalli, the SEC exhibited a different form of nonacquiescence, as it
ignored an adverse court of appeal's ruling not in its internal proceedings, but in
a district court. This type of nonacquiescence is not wholly unusual for the
Agency. For example, in Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC, the Second
Circuit upheld a district court's rejection of the SEC's motion to force a debtor
to refile a Chapter XI bankruptcy case under Chapter X.2 07 After the Solicitor
200. SEC v. Megalli, 157 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1254 (N.D. Ga. 2015).
201. Brief for the Plaintiff on Civil Penalties at 6, Megalli, 157 F: Supp. 3d 1240 (No.
1:13-CV-03783).
202. Id.
203. This aggressive use of disgorgement is consistent with the SEC's explicit position
with regard to the use of monetary penalties. For example, in 2013, then-Chair Mary Jo White said, "we
must make aggressive use of our existing penalty authority, recognizing that meaningful monetary
penalties-whether against companies or individuals-play a very important role in a strong enforcement
program." Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Remarks at the Council ofInstitutional Investors
Fall Conference in Chicago, IL: Deploying the Full Enforcement Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539841202 [http://perma.cc/NC83-6BAQ].
Around the same time, then-Director of Enforcement Andrew Ceresney asserted, "Monetary penalties
speak very loudly and in a language any potential defendant understands ... . Enforcement needs to be
aggressive in our use of penalties." Jean Eaglesham, SEC Ramps Up Fine Amounts to Deter Misconduct,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl000142405270
2 303 91 8 8045
79109554149460532 [http://perma.cc/9MPE-Z7NC].
204. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 681 (1989).
205. See, e.g., Borton, Inc. v. OSHRC, 734 F.2d 508,510 (10th Cir. 1984); YellowTaxi
ofMinn. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983); ITT World Commc'ns v. FCC, 635 F.2d 32,
43 (2d Cir. 1980).
206. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1018 (5th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017).




General refused to appeal to the Supreme Court, the SEC issued a "Statement of
Nonacquiescence" and continued to pursue its interpretation of the relevant
law.208 Outside of the Second Circuit, the SEC pressed its interpretation in hopes
of generating a circuit split. Inside the Second Circuit, it sought to chip away at
Grayson, with an end towards limiting its precedential power to its specific
facts.209
It is, of course, not unusual for a group to pursue litigation with an agenda
toward moving the law in a different direction, but it takes on special significance
when that group is an agency. Under the Supreme Court's deference regime, an
agency generally receives deference for its interpretations of its organic statutes,
but only to the extent to which the agency offers a thoughtful and convincing
construction of the statutory scheme.210 In the Megalli briefs, however, the SEC
does not primarily communicate thoughtfulness or thoroughness in its
consideration of the relevant law. Rather, it suggests-whether accurate or not-
an agency interested in augmenting its power.
B. The Limits of Deference: The SEC's Pattern of Tension with the Court
In fact, the Supreme Court has exhibited concern with the SEC's efforts to
expand the reach of securities law-a concern that has arguably resulted in the
agency losing its claim to deference a number of times in the past. The
development of insider trading law is illustrative of this trend. The SEC has long
pressed the view that the "purpose of the law is to alleviate asymmetries in
information between trading parties in order to promote 'fairness."' 2 1 1 The Court
has rejected the view in favor of a more limited interpretation of insider trading
as intended not to achieve "fairness," but rather "to regulate the improper use of
proprietary corporate information."2 12 In explaining its reasons for not deferring
to the Agency in its broader understanding of the law, the Court made clear its
discomfort with granting expansive power to the SEC.
For example, in Dirks v. SEC, Justice Powell noted that the SEC had
established a rule with "no limiting principle,"213 creating a situation in which
"market participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC's
litigation strategy."2 14 Such an arrangement, Justice Powell continued, "can be
208. Peter J. Rooney, Nonacquiescence by the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Its Relevance to the Nonacquiescence Debate, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1125 (1992).
209. Id. at 1126-28.
210. An interpretation offered in the context of litigation will generally receive
Skidmore deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). Under Skidmore, the
interpretation will be weighed according to "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it
power to persuade." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
211. Jonathan R. Macey, Beyond the Personal Benefit Test: The Economics ofTipping
by Insiders, 2 J.L. & PUB. AFF. 27, 30 (2017).
212. Id.
213. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
214. Id. at 664 n.24.
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hazardous, as the facts of this case make plain." 215 That facts to which Justice
Powell referred involved Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst, who "was the key
player in exposing a large-scale fraud" perpetrated by an insurance holding
company.2 16 The SEC accused Dirks of insider trading for warning his clients to
sell the company's stocks before the general public had learned of the fraud-
even though, before notifying his clients, he had attempted to disclose publicly
what he learned.2 17 Faced with a case in which the SEC was seeking to punish
the person who uncovered a major instance of fraud, the Court could not rely on
the "reasonableness" of the Agency and, instead, drew a line sharply limiting
what constitutes insider trading.218
Cases like Dirks reveal an important pattern in how the Court interacts with
the SEC. If the Agency litigates in a manner that suggests it will not reasonably
and thoughtfully set boundaries in how its exercises its broad authority, then the
Court will step in to set those limits itself. Further, the Court will do so without
giving deference,2 19 potentially leading to a more restraining interpretation of the
relevant authority than it otherwise would have if it trusted the agency to utilize
its discretion responsibly.
It is in this context that Kokesh should be understood as a warning to the
Agency.220 By pursuing an aggressive posture in resistance to established
precedent, the SEC undermined its claim to deference on the question of the
limits of disgorgement power and invited the Court to intervene. The holding in
Kokesh, which applied the five-year statute of limitation to disgorgement,
represents such an intervention. But the dicta of Justice Sotomayor's unanimous
opinion include further implied limitations. Most significant is the one already
alluded to. Justice Sotomayor cites Contorinis disapprovingly and notes that the
practice of disgorging profits gained by others "does not simply restore the status
quo; it leaves the defendant worse off." 22 1 The implication is clear: since
disgorgement is only statutorily authorized to the extent that it is equitable in
215. Id.




218. The line is delineated by the Personal Benefit Test. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
219. This lack of deference is particularly notable given that there is a colorable case to
be made that the SEC should receive Chevron deference on this sort of question. See Steven J. Cleveland,
Resurrecting Deference to the Securities and Exchange Commission: Mark Cuban Trading on Inside
Information, 65 FLA. L. REV. 73, 85 (2013).
220. Another relevant piece of context is that Kokesh is not the first time the Supreme
Court has rejected the SEC's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2018). In Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442,
448 (2013), the Court held that the five-year period for the government to bring an action for civil penalties
begins to run when the fraud occurs, and not-as the SEC argued-when it is discovered. Professor Macey
has characterized the opinion as a rebuke of the Agency's failure to act in a timely manner. Jonathan
Macey, Opinion Analysis: That Which Does Not Kill the SEC May Make the Agency Stronger,
SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/02/opinion-analysis-that-which-does-
not-kill-the-sec-may-make-the-agency-stronger [http://perma.cc/DU8L-WDMK].




nature,22 2 it may only be used to achieve ends compatible with traditional equity
powers-that is, to restore the status quo.
In essence, the Court has strongly signaled that Blatt, rather than
Contorinis, correctly embodies the law.2 2 3 The SEC has pressed that it needs the
more expansive disgorgement authority recognized in Contorinis in order to
disincentivize fraud by depriving the violator of the value of any intangible
benefits received.224 Kokesh thus suggests that the Court does not share the
Agency's view that disgorgement should be a flexible remedy to be used by the
agency as necessary to achieve deterrence. But a broader interpretation is also
possible. Footnote Three is carefully and deliberately worded, denying any
intention to ratify that the SEC can pursue judicial disgorgement or that "courts
have properly applied disgorgement principles" in the SEC context.22 5 Such
cautious wording seems intended to send a signal to the Agency-namely, that
the Court retains the ability to interpret the SEC's disgorgement authority in a
very narrow way; it could even go so far as effectively eliminating the remedy
by, for example, requiring that SEC disgorgement operate in a compensatory
manner. 226 While the arguments presented in this Note suggest hat such an
interpretation would not be the most appropriate one given past precedent, the
fact that the Court took pains not to ratify SEC disgorgement suggests that it was
intentionally maintaining the option to undercut the Agency's authority.
What the Court intended to signal by such a move is an exercise in
speculation. Viewed in the context of the SEC's decades of tension with the
Court, however, one interpretation seems particularly likely: the Court is
reminding the SEC that it can do more than merely police the Agency for its
aggressive posture by setting boundaries; it can punish the SEC by effectively
depriving it of its use of disgorgement. The SEC would be prudent to interpret
this warning as a signal to the agency that it should be policing itself. That is, it
should be more conservatively utilizing its disgorgement authority and should
define clearer boundaries.
As a practical matter, the SEC would be prudent to issue guidance in light
of Kokesh in which it sets out in relatively precise terms its policy for calculating
disgorgement. In fact, during oral argument, Justice Kagan noted that she found
222. The SEC's authority to seek disgorgement is based on the claim that it is an
equitable remedy and thus authorized by the general grant of equity jurisdiction to the district courts
provided by Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446
F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971).
223. This is a point that seemed to go unnoticed in a recent Second Circuit opinion that
upheld a disgorgement order for far more than the defendant's personal gains. SEC v. Metter, 706 F.
App'x 699, 702-03 (2d Cir. 2017) (upholding an order of disgorgement equal to the total amount that
"flowed into" the defendant's firm "as a result of the fraudulent scheme," and rejecting arguments that
this exceeded the defendant's "personal enrichment").
224. See James Tyler Kirk, Deranged Disgorgement, 8 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP &
L. 131, 155 (2015).
225. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 n.3.
226. While such an interpretation would be in tension with past precedent, as explicated
in Section I.B., the Court, of course, could set such precedent aside.
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it "unusual that the SEC has not given some guidance to its enforcement
department," expressing discomfort that "everything is sort of up to the particular
person at the SEC who decides to bring such a case."227 Any guidance issued by
the Agency should limit the application of the penalty to doing no more than
restoring the status quo. More particularly, it ought to make clear that only
personal gains be included in the calculation and that serious "consideration" be
given to "defendant's expenses that reduced the amount of illegal profit."
22 8 If
the SEC introduced guidance with a considered explanation of disgorgement's
statutory authorization, the Court would likely be reassured by this commitment
to a more conservative posture and afford the SEC's interpretation significant
deference.
In other words, the SEC ought to interpret Kokesh to suggest that its
campaign of nonacquiescence has reached its end; the Agency should lessen the
aggressiveness of its posture or risk a more dramatic repercussion-the ffective
loss of its authority to seek disgorgement. Adopting guidance would be an
important first step. If the Court can be confident that the SEC will be responsible
and restrained in its use of the remedy, it likely will not exercise the threat
implicit in footnote three of Kokesh.
V. Disgorgement in the FTC Context
Thus far, this Note has focused on rebutting the contention that the SEC's
use of disgorgement is not an equitable remedy. This discussion has been
motivated, in part, by the concern that a total removal of disgorgement from the
toolbox of equitable remedies would have a profound and detrimental impact on
the ability of federal agencies to enforce their substantive statutes. But as
discussed in Part III, the Court's jurisprudence on what remedies are authorized
by a particular statutory grant of equity jurisdiction takes into account such
context-specific factors as the general statutory scheme.
As a result, it is not necessarily the case that a decision with regard to
whether the SEC can seek judicial disgorgement would settle questions relating
to other agencies' authorization. For example, if the Court were to ground its
upholding of SEC disgorgement in the subsequent congressional ratification
theory outlined in Section III.B, then it would remain to be decided whether
disgorgement is generally available to agencies under generic grants of equitable
remedies. For this reason, individual analysis of each agency's use of judicial
disgorgement is necessary.
This Part offers such an analysis for the FTC. There are several reasons
why the FTC is an object of particular interest with regard to the question of
disgorgement authority. First, disgorgement plays a particularly important role
in the FTC's ability to achieve its antitrust ends. Second, much as the SEC's
227. Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529).




aggressive posture with regard to its disgorgement authority has arguably invited
rebuke from the Court,229 recent developments in the FTC's policies on
disgorgement present the specter of agency overreach. This suggests that FTC's
disgorgement authority is particularly vulnerable. Concern over the FTC's future
use of disgorgement seems warranted in light of the fact that the FTC was one
of the first agencies whose authority was challenged after Kokesh.230 While these
early challenges have been unsuccessful, the lessons in Part III suggest that the
FTC tread cautiously when considering more aggressive use of disgorgement.
A. The FTC's Historical Use ofDisgorgement
A study of the FTC's use of disgorgement reveals two noteworthy
similarities to SEC disgorgement. First, despite the fact that monetary remedies
such as disgorgement and restitution are less commonly employed by the FTC,
disgorgement plays an important role in FTC practice. Second, and more
concerning, the FTC has been increasingly aggressive with its use of
disgorgement over the last five years. These similarities should (and do) concern
FTC officials and proponents of disgorgement as an antitrust remedy2 3 1 -
Kokesh's warning, then, should be understood to extend beyond the SEC to the
FTC's use of disgorgement o remedy antitrust violations.
1. The Role of Disgorgement in FTC Antitrust Enforcement
The FTC has long sought a variety of equitable remedies by virtue of its
authority to seek injunctions under § 53(b).232 Pursuant to the ancillary equitable
authority that accompanies a statutory grant of injunction powers,23 3 these
remedies have included monetary remedies such as restitution and
disgorgement.2 34 The FTC historically used disgorgement as a remedy only
229. See supra Part III.
230. FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., No. 17 C 194, 2018 WL 482076 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14,
2018); FTC v. J. William Enters., No. 6:16-cv-2123-Orl-31DCI, 2017 WL 4776669, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Oct. 23, 2017); see also Client Alert: Reflections on Kokesh v. SEC: On the Lookout for "Elephants in
Mouseholes", KING & SPALDING (Feb. 9, 2018), http://www.kslaw.com/attachments/000/005/640
/original/ca020918.pdf [http://perma.cc/KG5T-B9P9] (discussing these challenges to the FTC's equitable
authority).
231. See, e.g., Benjamin Mundel & Lucas Croslow, How Kokesh Will Impact the FTC
and Other Agencies, LAw360 (June 22, 2017, 10:28 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/937090/how-
kokesh-will-impact-the-fic-and-other-agencies [http://perma.cc/DTV7-346U]; Royall; supra note 73.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018) grants the FTC the authority to pursue permanent
injunctions against the violators of any law enforced by the agency.
233. See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) (holding that when
Congress invokes federal courts' equity jurisdiction in a statute, as when Congress allows injunctions, "all
the inherent equitable powers of the [courts] are available for the proper and complete exercise of that
jurisdiction").
234. See 2003 Policy Statement, supra note 75.
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sparingly.235 Between 1980 and 2002, the Agency sought disgorgement in only
two cases.2 36 In Hearst Trust, the FTC sought and the defendant stipulated to the
disgorgement of $19 million in ill-gotten gains after the firm omitted important
documents from its merger filing, which impeded the FTC's ability to evaluate
the competitive effects of the merger.2 3 7 And in Mylan Laboratories, the FTC
sought and obtained disgorgement for an alleged conspiracy to monopolize the
market for two anti-anxiety drugs.2 3 8 The Agency sought disgorgement only
twice more over the next decade.239
The FTC's cautious approach to disgorgement is well articulated in its 2003
policy statement concerning the use of monetary remedies.2 4 0 The 2003 Policy
Statement was adopted unanimously by the Committee after it solicited
comments from practitioners and scholars, considered the existing jurisprudence
and literature, and held public discussions.2 4 1 Like the SEC and other agencies
that use disgorgement, the FTC deployed disgorgement "to deprive a wrongdoer
of his unjust enrichment" and to 'deter others' from future violations."
242 The
availability of monetary remedies is important because "[t]he competition
enforcement regime in the United States is multifaceted, and it is important and
beneficial that there be a number of flexible tools, as well as a number of
potential enforcers, available to address competitive problems in a particular
case."243 Despite the fact that the 2003 FTC did not consider disgorgement a
"routine remed[y] for antitrust cases," it recognized that it can play an important
role in fashioning remedies in "exceptional cases."24 In Hearst Trust, for
example, the FTC used disgorgement to alleviate the burden that would
otherwise be placed on private plaintiffs seeking to be made whole.2 4 5
235. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Dollars, Doctrine, and Damage Control: How





237. Final Order and Stipulated Permanent Injunction, FTC v. Hearst Trust, No.
1:01CV00734 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2001).
238. Ohlhausen, supra note 235, at 3; see Amended Complaint, FTC v. Mylan Labs.,
Inc., No. 98-cv-03114 (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 1999); FTC Reaches Record Financial Settlement to Settle Charges
ofPrice-Fixing in Generic Drug Market, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 19,2000), http://www.fic.gov
/news-events/press-releases/2000/11/ftc-reaches-record-financial-settlement-settle-charges-price [http://
perma.cc/MDB6-AX2M].
239. Id. at 5; see FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011); Complaint,
FTC v. Perrigo Co., No. 1:04CV01397 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004).
240. 2003 Policy Statement, supra note 75.
241. Ohlhausen, supra note 235, at 4.
242. 2003 Policy Statement, supra note 75 (quoting SEC v. First City Fin. Corp., 890
F.2d 1215, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at n.14 ("For example, Hearst presented the somewhat unusual case of a
consummated merger that had passed through the HSR review process. Absent FTC action, private
plaintiffs would have faced the possibly discouraging prospect of not only having to prove a violation of




More recent directives from the FTC have broken with the position the
disgorgement is reserved for "exceptional cases."2 46  In 2012, the FTC
emphasized that "[b]ecause the ordinary purpose and effect of anticompetitive
conduct is to enrich wrongdoers at the expense of consumers," disgorgement is
an important remedy in antitrust enforcement and is consistent with the
Commission's prior antitrust and consumer protection work-doubly so given
the limits on the FTC's ability to seek disgorgement in other fora. The FTC is
unable, for instance, to seek disgorgement in internal agency adjudications.2 47
The Commission also suggested that the availability of a private remedy has
increasingly been little consolation to injured consumers.24 8
While the Agency did not elaborate on the "increased burdens on plaintiff,"
it cited a recent article by Professor Einer Elhauge, suggesting the concerns the
Commission had in mind.2 4 9 Elhauge argues that, given developments in the
antitrust jurisprudence, "the adequacy of private actions seems increasingly
dubious, especially in monopolization cases."250 Such cases often involve direct
purchasers who pass on the costs of anticompetition downstream and who are
often unwilling to sue.25 1 The indirect, downstream purchasers typically lack
standing to sue under the Illinois Brick doctrine, which held that only the direct
purchaser has suffered an injury for the purposes of antitrust law. 2 52 Even when
suit is possible by consumers, the consumers' individual stakes in the cases are
often too low to support the cost of litigation.2 5 3 This small-stakes problem is
compounded by a recent trend of courts to bar class actions because the injuries
in monopolization cases are too individualized.254 And, finally, some unilateral
antitrust violations are not covered by private rights of action but still fall within
show a violation of the Hart-Scott-Rodino premerger notification rules to explain why the FTC took no
action with respect to the merger.").
246. Withdrawal of the Commission's Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable
Remedies in Competition Cases, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (July 31, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Withdrawal]
("Accordingly, while disgorgement and restitution are not appropriate in all cases, we do not believe they
should apply only in 'exceptional cases,' as previously set out in the Policy Statement."), http://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/296171/12073 1commstmt-monetaryremedies
.pdf [http://perma.cc/VYH4-3L3V].
247. Cf Ohlhausen, supra note 235, at 9-13 (discussing how a desire to pursue
disgorgement has diverted cases that would normally be adjudicated by the FTC into federal courts).
248. 2012 Withdrawal, supra note 246, at 2-3 (noting that FTC judicial disgorgement
is particularly important "[a]t a time when Supreme Court jurisprudence has increased burdens on
plaintiffs").
249. Id. (citing Einer Elhauge, Disgorgement as an Antitrust Remedy, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 79 (2009)).
250. Elhauge, supra note 249, at 83.
251. Id.
252. Id. (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729 (1977)). But see John C.
Brinkerhoff Jr., Ropes of Sand: Stcite Antitrust Statutes Bound by Their Original Scope, 34 YALE J. ON
REG. 353, 376 (2017) (noting that the majority of states have passed "Illinois Brick Repealers" to empower
such suits under state antitrust statutes).
253. Id. at 83.
254. Id. at 83-84.
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the FTC's jurisdiction.255  These arguments support the position that
disgorgement is a crucial piece in the FTC's antitrust enforcement puzzle,
despite its historically infrequent use and the technical availability of private
alternatives.
But while these arguments lend support to the view that disgorgement is
sometimes appropriate in the antitrust context, they do not imply that the FTC
should be unconstrained in its use of the remedy. As explained below, what is
troubling about the FTC's developing policy stance with regard to disgorgement
is not that it has indicated a greater willingness to seek the remedy, but rather
that the agency has failed to articulate reasonable limits to its use-a problem
similar to that which troubled the Court with regard to the SEC in Kokesh.
2. A Shift Toward Unconstrained Use of Disgorgement?
The FTC's position on disgorgement has been characterized by a
problematic shift from restrained and transparent principles to an unconstrained
assertion of authority. The FTC's now-withdrawn 2003 Policy Statement falls
squarely into the mold of the guidance that the SEC ought to publish.
2 56 In that
sense, it was a model of the sort of thoughtful and articulated position on the use
of the remedy that reassures the Court that the agency can be trusted with the
authority.
The statement announced a new, three-part approach to determining the
kinds of cases in which the FTC would seek monetary remedies, including
disgorgement. First, the Commission would "ordinarily seek monetary
disgorgement only when the violation is clear," which is when "a reasonable
party should expect that the conduct at issue would likely be found to be
illegal." 257 This part of the FTC's approach was designed to limit the punitive
nature of disgorgement by applying it only to those who could have reasonably
anticipated it. By narrowing the application of disgorgement, the FTC limited
the use of disgorgement to cases in which its deterrent effect would be
strongest.258 Second, the Commission would only seek disgorgement when there
was a "reasonable basis for calculating the amount of the disgorgement. . . to be
ordered."2 5 9 And third, the FTC would consider disgorgement only when it
anticipated that other remedies would be insufficient to accomplish fully the
purposes of antitrust laws.
26 0
255. Id. at 84. Hearst Trust may represent an example of this gap, reinforcing the
importance of the availability of disgorgement in that case. See FTC v. Hearst Trust, No. 1:01CV00734
(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2001).
256. See supra Section III.B.







This policy statement seems almost tailor-made to address the Kokesh
Court's concerns with the SEC's aggressive use of disgorgement. The first factor
caps the penal nature of disgorgement, ensuring that it is used only when it could
have made a difference in the conduct. The second directly addresses the concern
that disgorgement would be sought when the amount is unbounded or unrelated
to the actual ill-gotten gains. And the third is a general promise that disgorgement
will not displace the traditional remedies that the FTC had used for nearly a
century to enforce antitrust laws. These factors should significantly ameliorate
the concerns of the Kokesh Court; it appears that the 2003 FTC policy bears none
of the aggressive hallmarks of SEC disgorgement hat so worried the Justices.
In 2012, the FTC suddenly withdrew the 2003 Policy Statement.261 The
Commission argued that "the Policy Statement [had] chilled the pursuit of
monetary remedies in the years since the statement's issuance."262 Contrary to
the FTC's prior practice, the 2012 Withdrawal noted that "competition cases may
often be appropriate candidates for monetary equitable relief." 26 3 Unlike with the
creation of the 2003 Policy Statement, the Commission rescinded the policy over
the spirited dissent of one member and without soliciting public comment or
discussion.26 4 This change in direction puts the FTC firmly back into the
unconstrained territory that so concerned the Kokesh Court. Then-Commissioner
(and now Acting FTC Chairman) Maureen Ohlhausen dissented from the 2012
Withdrawal, characterizing the move as a naked desire to be less constrained.26 5
And she noted that a newfound zeal for disgorgement had distorted the FTC's
enforcement practices, shifting cases away from administrative resolution and
into federal court and undermining the FTC's unique ability to shape antitrust
law.266
The warping influence of unconstrained discretion to seek disgorgement is
compounded by an increase in the frequency with which the FTC seeks
disgorgement-in more than twice as many cases between 2012 and 2016 as in
the three preceding decades.267 More concerning still, Chairman Ohlhausen has
noted a recent case in which the FTC sought disgorgement in which "there was
no reasonable basis for calculating the amount of remedial payment."2 6 8 Without
the guarantee of the second prong in the 2003 Policy Statement's approach to
disgorgement, there is no guarantee that the disgorgement sought will match (or
even be related to) the amount of ill-gotten gains. Given that these concerns are
261. See 2012 Withdrawal, supra note 225.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Ohlhausen, supra note 234, at 6-7.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 9-13.
267. Id. at 7.
268. Id. at 8 (citing FTC v. Cardinal Health, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, at 2 (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public
statements/637761/150420cardinathealthohlhausen.pdf [http://perma.cc/864U-GRDH]).
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quite close to those that animated the Kokesh Court, continuing on this
aggressive path risks judicial retaliation against the FTC.
B. The Affirmative Case for FTC Disgorgement
As discussed in the examination of Kokesh and the SEC's use of
disgorgement, there is every reason to believe that disgorgement is a remedy
available to courts sitting in equity. But, as noted above, the Court could also
interpret statutory grants of equitable remedies as demanding more
individualized analysis of whether a particular agency may seek judicial
disgorgement. Section III.B put forward the argument that the SEC has been
affirmatively authorized to seek disgorgement. This Section lays out an argument
that the FTC's use of disgorgement is necessary for the agency to comply the
mandates of its substantive statutes and the Court's jurisprudence.
As William Baxter, former Assistant Attorney General of the Justice
Department's Antitrust Division, has noted, the Supreme Court has taken a
"common law" approach to the development of antitrust law.2 6 9 The two
foundational antitrust statutes, the Sherman Act2 70 and the Clayton Act,2 7 1 were
enacted in 1890 and 1914, respectively. Since then, Congress has made only
minimal changes to the statutes.272 Instead, the courts have been tasked with
applying the broad statutory directives to diverse and evolving patterns of fact.
2 73
The Supreme Court itself has been explicit about this approach, noting that the
Sherman Act "has a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be
desirable in constitutional provisions."274 Indeed, the requirement that the courts
apply century-old statutes to the dynamic business world has required the
''common law" approach: "Just as the common law adapts to modern
understanding and greater experience, so too does the Sherman Act's prohibition
on 'restraint[s] of trade' evolve to meet the dynamics of present economic
269. William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the
"Common Law " Nature ofAntitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661 (1982); see also Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 888 (2007) ("Yet the Sherman Act's use of 'restraint of trade'
'invokes the common law itself, . . . not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to
the term in 1890." (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988))).
270. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(2012)).
271. Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2012)).
272. R. Hewitt Pate, Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 1 (May
11, 2004), http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/file/5 17986/download [http://perma.cc/PH49-YERH].
273. Id.; see also Charles S. Dameron, Note, Present at Antitrust's Creation: Consumer
Welfare in the Sherman Act's State Statutory Forerunners, 125 YALE L.J. 1072, 1075 (2016) ("[T]he
judiciary enjoys an especially wide authority to fill statutory gaps when interpreting the Sherman Act due
to the Act's ambiguous language, its constancy over time, and the fact-peculiar in light of many modem
regulatory regimes-that Congress did not assign rulemaking authority to an administrative agency.").




conditions."275 Further, this flexible approach to antitrust law is not limited to
determining what constitutes unlawful restraints of trade. For example, the
Court's understanding of the Sherman Act's relationship to state antitrust laws
evolved considerably over time.2 76 Thus, the Court's approach to the
development of antitrust law generally has been characterized by its flexibility
and the Court's willingness to adapt jurisprudence to meet the needs of the
general aims and needs of competition statutes.
The flexible, goal-oriented tack that the Court takes with respect o antitrust
law applies by logical necessity to antitrust remedies. The Supreme Court, in
United States v. Grinnell Corp., summarized its approach to fashioning remedies
in antitrust cases: "We start from the premise that adequate relief in a
monopolization case should put an end to the combination and deprive the
defendants of any of the benefits of the illegal conduct, and break up or render
impotent the monopoly power found to be in violation of the Act." 277 The
Grinnell Court derives this principle from another case, Schine Chain Theaters
v. United States,27 8 in which the Court confirmed the FTC's statutory authority
to seek divestiture under §13(b).279
Divestiture was authorized, the Court held, in part because it served to
further the Act's goals by "depriv[ing] the antitrust defendants of the benefits of
their conspiracy"280-the core function of disgorgement. Just two years after
Grinnell, the Court emphatically noted that "[i]t is of course established that, in
a § 2 case ... it is the duty of the court to prescribe relief which will . .. deny to
the defendant the fruits of its statutory violation."281 And more directly, the Court
has held that the FTC can seek and courts can order the divestiture of privately
owned property "if the property was acquired ... as a result of practices which
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade."282 The Court's justification reflects
the same need to correct incentives for which disgorgement is employed:
"Otherwise, there would be reward from the conspiracy through retention of its
fruits .... Its function includes undoing what the conspiracy achieved.. . . [T]he
275. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007); see
also Baxter, supra note 269, at 666 ("[T]he common-law approach ... permits the law to adapt to new
learning without the trauma of refashioning more general rules that afflict statutory law.").
276. See Brinkerhoff, supra note 252, at 360.
277. 384 U.S. 563, 577 (1966).
278. 334 U.S. 110 (1948), overruled on other grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Indep.
Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
279. Id. at 128 ("To require divestiture of theatres unlawfully acquired is not to add to
the penalties that Congress has provided in the antitrust laws. Like restitution it merely deprives a
defendant of the gains from his wrongful conduct. It is an equitable remedy designed in the public interest
to undo what could have been prevented had the defendants not outdistanced the government in their
unlawful project.").
280. Id.
281. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244, 250 (1968).
282. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 171 (1948).
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requirement that the defendants restore what they unlawfully obtained is no more
punishment than the familiar remedy of restitution."283
Scholars have noted that the language of this line of cases is potentially
broad enough to directly authorize disgorgement.28 4 Indeed, one reading of the
cases in this Section yields the principle that the FTC may be required to seek
disgorgement if doing so is the only way to "deprive the defendants of any of the
benefits of the illegal conduct" (or achieve any other part of the Grinnell test).285
If nonmonetary remedies, such as injunction or divestiture, were insufficient to
deprive a violator of the fruits of his illicit conduct, the logic of Grinnell would
mandate that the FTC seek and courts issue disgorgement of profits. The FTC's
2003 Policy Statement relied on Grinnell and Schine Chain Theaters in
explaining that "[d]epriving the violator of any of the benefits of illegal conduct
has long been accepted as an appropriate, indeed necessary, element of antitrust
remedies."28 6 There are many such corner-cases when the FTC's other remedies
and private actions would fail to deprive a violator completely of the benefit of
his illicit conduct. Such cases can arise when private action is blocked by statutes
of limitations or misaligned market incentives, when individual injuries are
insignificant (but the aggregate injury is large), or when direct purchasers do not
sue.287
In cases such as these, the FTC is faced with a choice: seek monetary
remedies or fail to accomplish a primary objective of antitrust enforcement by
allowing violators to profit from misconduct.28 8 The logical necessity of
disgorgement as a remedy illustrates that it has been affirmatively authorized by
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the antitrust statutes. Given the Court's
efforts to construct an antitrust regime that satisfies the ends of promoting
competition, the Court should give this consideration significant weight in
determining whether the FTC has the authority to pursue disgorgement. How the
Court would weigh those strong arguments in favor of disgorgement against the
relative newness of the remedy is an open question, but the flexible, statute
specific equity framework laid out in this Note suggests the power should, and
likely would, be upheld.
283. Id. at 171-72.
284. Elhauge, supra note 248, at 80 ("This language seems broad enough not only to
authorize the government to bring antitrust claims seeking the disgorgement of any supracompetitive
profits causally related to antitrust violations, but even to require doing so in any case where other
remedies do not suffice to deprive a violator of all its illicit fruits."). Elhauge also relies on this line of
cases to rebut any presumption that the infrequency with which the FTC employs disgorgement is rooted
in insecurity about its justification to do so. Id. at 79.
285. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 577 (1966).
286. 2003 Policy Statement, supra note 75.
287. Id.
288. Hearst presents such a situation. Absent FTC action, plaintiffs would have faced





Despite all the prognostication, judicial disgorgement sought by the SEC is
not going away. The Kokesh Court's determination that SEC disgorgement is a
penalty for the purposes of § 2462's statute of limitations is consistent with
earlier. Court precedents that found disgorgement to be equitable. But Kokesh
does have wider implications for the SEC and the administrative state writ large.
For one, the SEC would be prudent to understand the wide-ranging dicta in the
unanimous opinion as a signal that the Court is concerned with its aggressive
utilization of disgorgement. As a first step towards assuaging the Court and
earning its trust-and thus, importantly, its deference-the SEC should
promulgate new, conservative guidance setting out the limits of disgorgement.
Similarly, the FTC ought to consider returning to its earlier guidelines or
promulgating new ones. Like the SEC, the FTC has aggressively utilized its
disgorgement authority and-while there is a strong case to be made that the
agency ought to retain that authority-Kokesh suggests that the Court is willing
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